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INTRODUCTION

NE must know the rules of any game to play it. Winning, however, requires preparation, skill, luck and an understanding of
the fundamentals of the game. This Article focuses on the fundamentals. Part I of this Article appeared in an earlier issue of the
Villanova Law Review and covered the fundamentals that underlie
directors' decisions and shareholder challenges for day-to-day
board decisions.' Understanding Part II of this Article requires that
the reader explore and comprehend Part I.
Typically, corporate litigation begins when a shareholder challenges a board's decision. The challenging shareholder may bring
suit to prevent the corporation from taking action, to require the
corporation to take action or to seek damages arising out of actions
taken or decisions made by the board.2 These cases require the
court to review the challenged board decisions. In reviewing those
decisions, the court must decide upon and apply the appropriate
level of scrutiny. The level of scrutiny is frequently referred to as
"the standard of review." The court must also decide which party1. See generally Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of
Directors' Duties in Delaware: The Rules of the Game, 40 ViLL. L. REv. 1297 (1995)

("Part I").
2. See Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992) (holding
derivative suit is equitable remedy where shareholder asserts claim on behalf of
corporation); see also Palm & Kearney, supra note 1, at 1330-49 (discussing derivative challenges to board action).
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the challenging shareholder or the board-will have the burden of
proof with respect to issues involved in the case. Part I discussed
the deferential rule usually applied to day-to-day decisions of the
board-the "business judgment rule."'3 Part II addresses the enhanced scrutiny standard of review that courts apply to transactions
involving actual or potential conflicts of interest on the part of the
directors or a controlling shareholder.
Delaware courts have played a preeminent role in defining fiduciary duties because of the significant number of major corporations incorporated in Delaware. In recent years, increased
shareholder scrutiny of board decisions has resulted in many cases
brought by shareholders challenging board decisions. In turn, the
Delaware courts have recently decided a number of cases that discuss and clarify the duties of Delaware directors when they seek to
adopt defensive measures, when there is a sale of the company or a
change in control and when the board seeks to manipulate share4
holder voting rights.

This Part intends to serve as a primer for those seeking an understanding of the standards used by courts applying Delaware law
when reviewing directors' responses to shareholder challenges. In
Part I, we outlined the rules applicable in the majority of cases in
which shareholders challenge a board's decision involving basic operational matters. 5 In such situations, Delaware courts presume
that the board's decision was proper and in the best interests of the
corporation, unless the shareholder can show a breach of the
board's fiduciary duties of care, loyalty or good faith. 6 If the shareholder rebuts the court's presumption of propriety, known as the
"business judgment rule," then the court will apply a stricter stan-

3. See Palm & Kearney, supra note 1, at 1300-20 (explaining what business
judgment rule is, when it is applied and why presumptions attach).
4. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding Co., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986) (defining standard to review board's conduct where corporation is
up for sale or there is change in control situation); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (defining standard to review board's adoption
of defensive measures); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch.
1988) (defining standard to review board's manipulation of shareholder voting
rights).
5. See generally Palm & Kearney, supra note 1 (discussing basic rules of directors' duties in Delaware).
6. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) [hereinafter Cede I] (stating business judgment rule presumes corporate directors acted
with due care, good faith and loyalty).
0
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dard of review and will require the board to show that its decisions
7
were "entirely fair" to the shareholders.
This Part reviews the directors' obligations under heightened
standards of review applied by courts when shareholders challenge
directors' decisions that involve defensive measures, the sale or
change of control of the company or shareholder voting rights.
Section II provides a historical background of the enhanced scrutiny standard that courts apply in the takeover context." Section III
addresses the context in which directors unilaterally adopt defensive measures in response to a threat to corporate control.9 Section
IV explains the duties of a corporation's directors when the corporation is offered for sale or is subject to a change in control.10 Section V discusses the court's strict standard of review of directors'
actions perceived to impede or frustrate the shareholders' voting
franchise.' Section VI explains the impact that approval or ratification by disinterested directors or shareholders can have on a
breach of fiduciary duty suit challenging the board's business decisions.' 2 Section VII concludes by discussing the complexities of the
law and recognizing the necessity of compartmentalizing this Article to provide a better understanding of corporate law for the student and practitioner. Appendix A is a decision tree that depicts
the application of the primary rules discussed in Parts I and II of
3
this Article.'
It is important to recognize that the differing standards of review and the shifting burdens and presumptions discussed in this
Article necessarily result in each party structuring arguments to try
to persuade the courts to apply the standard of review most
favorable to that party. The authors intend the rules set out in this
Article to serve as a teaching tool and an outline for the business
law practitioner and student in reviewing the propriety of directors'
7. See Cinerama,. Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995)
(holding, where plaintiff rebuts business judgment rule, directors must prove entire fairness).
8. For a discussion of the historical background surrounding the creation of

enhanced scrutiny, see infra notes 14-43 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the enhanced Unocalstandard, see infra notes 44-94 and
accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the enhanced Revlon standard, see infra notes 95-149
and accompanying text.

11. For a discussion of the enhanced Blasius standard, see infra notes 150-87
and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of ratification in the nonmerger context, see infra notes
188-282 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the conclusion of this Article, see infra notes 283-85
and accompanying text.
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actions when the directors face an inherent conflict between their
position and the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. This Article does not, and could not, advise the reader of every
nuance in each area. Rather, as in all disciplines, the authors hope
that the reader will master the basic rules and then, when faced
with these issues, will become the author of a new creative challenge or defense when shareholders challenge a board's decision.
II.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TRANSACTIONS REQUIRING ENHANCED
JUDICIAL REVIEW

As discussed in great detail in Part I, directors of a Delaware
corporation may generally rely upon the business judgment rule to
protect day-to-day business decisions. 14 As both an evidentiary and
substantive rule, the rule attaches the presumption that, in making
business decisions, the board acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that its decision was in the best interests of the corporation. 15 A court, therefore, will not substitute its
judgment for that of a board. 16 The protections of the business
judgment rule also attach to a board's decision not to act.' 7 A
shareholder can rebut the presumptions of the business judgment
rule by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the directors breached one of the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care and good
faith.' 8 Upon rebutting the business judgment rule, the burden
14. See Palm & Kearney, supra note 1 (detailing business judgment rule, entire
fairness and shifting standards of review and burdens of proof); see also Unitrin,
Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372 (Del. 1995) (stating that business judgment rule will be applied if there is no defensive measure employed);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (noting that
board has obligation to determine whether hostile offer is in best interest of shareholders and "its decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise
would be accorded in the realm of business judgment").
15. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (pointing out that
courts presume that directors normally act in good faith and with honest belief
that action was taken in best interest of corporation).
16. See id. (noting effect of directors' breach of fiduciary duty on applicability
of business judgment rule); see also Unoca 493 A.2d at 958 (stating that court

would not substitute its judgment for judgment of board unless decisions were
made with purpose of staying in office or as result of some other breach of fiduciary duty). But see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (applying court's own judgment when parent company received benefit to exclusion
of subsidiary).
17. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 ("[A] conscious decision to refrain from act-

ing may nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule.").
18. SeeA.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112-

13 (Del. Ch. 1986) (describing how court will examine facts concerning unreasonableness of board's actions).
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shifts to the board to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that its actions were entirely fair to the shareholders.1 9
The standard of review and burden of proof issues for day-today business decisions were explored in depth in Part I of this Article. 20 Occasionally, however, the board faces decisions that affect

the very core of the corporation's existence. The most typical types
of these decisions involve: (1) the institution of defensive mechanisms, or so-called "takeover defenses," to protect the corporation
from potentially harmful suitors; (2) the sale of, or change of control in, the corporation; or (3) the board taking action that may
thwart or dilute the shareholders' right to vote.2 1 These categories
can overlap. For example, the board may desire to sell the corporation to a particular buyer and adopt defensive measures to thwart
22
any other potential suitors.
A takeover, merger, acquisition or change of control may be
harmful to the shareholders or it may be beneficial. On the one
hand, a merger or acquisition may benefit the shareholders if they
get a high price for their stock. A merger can result in synergies
that benefit the stockholders of both companies.2 3 On the other
hand, a takeover can leave the company in financial ruins and t~le
individual investor with little more than a worthless stock
certificate.
Because of the obvious importance of a decision to sell the
company, directors in Delaware play a pivotal role in determining
19. See id. at 114-15 (holding that directors' failure to meet enhanced scrutiny
standard of review will result in application of "entire fairness" standard of review
because directors violated their duty of loyalty); see also Cinerama Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) (illustrating that entire fairness standard requires careful analysis by courts); Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., No.
CIV.A.11977, 1996 WL 204502, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1996) (finding that lack of
fair dealing and fair pricing resulted in breach of fiduciary duty); Palm & Kearney,
supra note 1, at 1316-20 (discussing how business judgment rule affects standard of
review that court employs).
20. For an in depth discussion of the shifting standards of review and burdens
of proof, see Palm & Kearney, supra note 1, at 1316-20.
21. For a discussion of when Delaware courts apply "enhanced scrutiny," see
infra notes 44-187 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 180-81 (reviewing Revlon's adoption of "poison pill" to avoid hostile takeover
by Pantry Pride).
23. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985)
(describing how short-term investors may prosper from merger and recognizing
that board may reasonably consider basic stockholder interests at stake, including
those of short-term speculators whose hope for short-term gain fuels hope of hostile offeror at expense of long-term investor).
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what best serves the interests of the corporation. 24 For instance, as

a statutory prerequisite, a board must approve a merger or sale of
25
the corporation before the shareholders may vote on the issue.
As will be discussed, Delaware law also permits corporations to erect
defensive measures designed to discourage or inhibit unwanted
suitors.

26

A variety of conflicts of interest may arise when the board acts
in the face of a possible takeover or sale of the company.27 A takeover of the corporation may result in the loss of ajob for an inside
director, a director who is also employed as an officer of the corporation, while an outside director may be ousted from the board,
losing the prestige and privileges attendant to that position. 28 In
addition, visions of the corporation's future may conflict. The incumbent board may seek long-term continued growth, whereas the
acquiror or some shareholders may desire short-term gain.
These conflicts raise several issues. Can directors unilaterally
enact defensive measures? Can directors favor one bidder's offer
over another when a change in control is imminent? Can directors
take action that affects the shareholders' voting rights in order to
assist the board in achieving the board's goal? Can directors rely
24. See id. at 954 (citing Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th
Cir. 1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 704 (2d Cir. 1980);
Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (M.D. Ill. 1969); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d
548, 556 (Del. 1964); Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 92 A.2d 295, 302
(Del. 1952); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568-69 (Del. Ch. 1977); Kors v.
Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. Ch. 1960)).
25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1974 & Supp. 1994) ("The board of
directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a
resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation.").
26. See id. § 214 ("The certificate of incorporation ... may provide that...
each holder of stock ...

shall be entitled to ...

the number of votes which ...

he

would be entitled to cast for the election of directors."); see also Revlon 506 A.2d at
180 (noting that board has power to adopt defensive measures such as poison pill).
Other mechanisms include "white knights," classified board memberships, blocked
stock, street sweeps and cumulative voting.
27. See Unocal 493 A.2d at 954 (detailing "omnipresent specter" of conflict of
interest when directors are faced with enacting defensive measures in response to
unwelcome challenge for corporate control).
28. See Kahn v. Roberts, 679 A.2d 460, 465 (Del. 1996) (recognizing temptation for directors to act to retain their positions "in order to protect their own
powers and perquisites"). When a director is faced with voting upon a hostile offer, however, the prestige and perquisites of their position will not be presumed to
outweigh a director's economic self-interest in obtaining the most profit possible.
Cf Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1380 (Del. 1995) (noting
that courts cannot presume, without evidence, that directors will be subconsciously
motivated to vote against otherwise adequate hostile offers merely because these
offers do not include compensation for directors' loss of "prestige and
perquisites").
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upon a majority of informed shareholders to ratify their decisions?
In each case, the ultimate question is what deference should be
given by the reviewing court to board decisions that affect the well29
being and continued existence of the corporation.
When courts review board decisions in these "extraordinary"
cases, they find themselves on the horns of a dilemma in deciding
which standard of review to apply. On the one hand, protecting
the corporation and its shareholders from harm is among the
board's primary responsibilities. 30 Because courts should encourage and protect such decisions, applying the deferential business judgment rule standard to these defensive decisions seems
3
appropriate. '
On the other hand, defensive measures are often used to ward
off unwanted suitors that desire to buy or otherwise obtain a controlling interest in the company. If successful in fending off wouldbe suitors, the defensive measure has the obvious effect of helping
the incumbent board remain in office. Thus, defensive measures
that touch upon control of the corporation raise the potential inference that they were adopted, not to protect the corporation, but
rather to maintain the board's power and privileges. 32 If the latter
reason is the director's underlying motivation, their conflict of in29. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1374 (citing E. Norman Veasey, The New Incarnation of the BusinessJudgment Rule in Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 503, 504-05
(1986)).
30. See Mills Acquisition Corp. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del.
1988) ("Not only do [the duties of care and loyalty] demand that corporate fiduciaries absolutely refrain from any act which breaches the trust reposed in them, but
also to affirmatively protect and defend those interests entrusted to them."); Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (recognizing duty of board to protect
shareholders from harm). In Guth, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that:
Public policy ... has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interest of the
corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of privity
or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.
Id.
31. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("The business
judgment rule exists to promote the full and free exercise of the management
power granted to Delaware directors.") (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981)).
32. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 83 (Del. 1992) (recognizing presumption that board acted without ratifying vote of shareholders in order to retain control); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) ("[B]ear in mind the
inherent danger in the purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a threat
to corporate policy when a threat to control is involved. The directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult."
(citing Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962))).
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terest should trigger strict scrutiny, requiring the board to prove
the entire fairness of the transaction. 33 Determining the real mo34
tive of the board, however, is very difficult.
Because defensive measures frequently protect the corporation
and shareholders from harmful actions, strict scrutiny might in fact
hurt the shareholders because fewer defensive measures could survive the onerous entire fairness standard. 35 Although this would
seem to justify the application of the deferential business judgment
rule, applying the business judgment rule in these situations seems
to minimize the inherent potential conflict of interest of the board
36
in such situations.
Recognizing this dilemma, the Delaware Supreme Court chose
neither the business judgment rule nor the entire fairness standard
as the applicable standard in such situations. Instead, the court
adopted a new standard of review that recognizes both the board's
potential conflict of interest and the salutary effects of some defen33. See Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., No. CIV.A.11977, 1996 WL 204502, at *5
(Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1996) (analyzing aspects of entire fairness).
34. See id. at *14 (noting that board's actual motive is often disputed).
35. See In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A.14616,
1996 WL 752356, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1996) (recognizing that "proper course"
in enhanced scrutiny case "is to deny the motion to dismiss, permit the plaintiffs to
pursue discovery, and give the defendants an opportunity to satisfy the enhanced
scrutiny standard"); A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d
103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting,
the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of the outcome of [the] litigation.").
36. See Solash v. Telex Corp., No. CWV.A.9518, 1988 WL 3587, at *8 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 19, 1988) ("Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, information and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts ...
courts have long been reluctant to second-guess such decisions when they appear
to have been made in good faith."); see also Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131,
1144 (Del. 1990) (stating that Unocal applies when threat touches upon issues of
control). The Gilbert court noted that "[b]earing in mind that Unocats enhanced
scrutiny arises from the appearance of certain inherent conflicts attendant to the
invocation of defensive measures designed to thwart or impede a takeover, no
clearer application of Unocal could be conceived than under the circumstances
here." Id. (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del.
1985)). In Gilbert, Burlington, a stockholder in El Paso, made a tender offer for
49.1% of El Paso's outstanding stock. Id. at 1135. Upon successful completion of
the tender offer, Burlington would retain control of 51.8% of El Paso's outstanding stock. See id. The court stated that the existence of a back-end, freeze-out
merger was significant and constituted a threat to the interests of El Paso and its
stockholders. See id. at 1146 (stating that record showed El Paso's directors were
concerned about shareholder interests). The tender offer included no plans to
purchase the remaining minority shares. See id. Therefore, the board satisfied the
first prong of Unocaland could enact proportionate defensive measures. See id. at
1145-46 (indicating that directors' actions were reasonable and their investigation
exhaustive).
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sive measures.3 7 The new standard of review formed a compromise
between the entire fairness standard, which places the burden on
the board, and the business judgment rule, which places the bur-

den on the challenging party. The compromise mandates that,
before the courts apply the business judgment rule, the board has
the threshold burden to show that its decision to erect defensive
38
measures was reasonable.

This standard of review, referred to as intermediate or "enhanced" scrutiny, shifts the burden of proof to the board of directors to demonstrate the reasonableness of its actions before the
courts will apply the presumptions of the business judgment rule.3 9
"Enhanced scrutiny," however, is a misnomer. Although enhanced
scrutiny review is more stringent than the business judgment rule, it
is far less exacting than the entire fairness standard of review because the board is not required to show that the decision was fair;
40
rather the board must show only that the decision was reasonable.

37. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957 (asserting that defensive steps against dissident
shareholder groups have been upheld by Delaware courts) (citing Hibbert v.
Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339 (Del. 1983); Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture
Screen Corp., 171 A. 226 (Del. 1934)). Specifically, the court applied a heightened scrutiny standard in change of control situations. Additionally, the court applied heightened scrutiny when directors attempted to dilute shareholder
ownership. See Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 776 (Del. Ch.
1967) (applying per se heightened scrutiny to invalidate target directors issuance
of new shares because directors failed to demonstrate justifiable belief that there
was threat from majority shareholders). Further, the Delaware courts long applied
more exacting standards of review to directors' conduct when it appeared that the
directors sought to alter the shareholders' voting franchise.
38. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995)
(discussing well-known Unocal standard that requires board to prove that actions
were reasonable and proportionate).
39. See id. at 1374-75 (discussing how court must review directors' decision
where stockholders' rights affected). But see Emerson Radio Corp. v. International
Jensen Inc., No. CIV.A.15130, 1996 WL 483086, at *13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 1996)
(requiring action by shareholder to have standing to claim that court must apply
enhanced scrutiny to contemplated transaction). Faced with the enhanced risk
that the directors may breach their duty of loyalty by benefitting themselves and
possibly overlooking the shareholders' best interests, the courts applied an "enhanced scrutiny" to directors' action before attaching the presumptions of the
business judgment rule. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (noting that directors' satisfaction of enhanced scrutiny standard is threshold or condition precedent to
court's application of business judgment rule); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (recognizing enhanced duty upon directors in this conflict of interest situation); see also
U.S. West, Inc. v. Time Warner, Inc., No. CIV.A.14555, 1996 WL 307445, at *21
(Del. Ch. June 6, 1996) (requiring "that corporate fiduciaries not prefer their own
interests to corporate interests even in transactions in which neither the fiduciary
nor an affiliate is a participant").
40. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (defining enhanced scrutiny standard).
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This shifting of the initial burden of proof to the directors allays the
41
concerns about possible director interest.
If the directors meet their threshold burden of proof that their
decision was reasonable, the standard. of review changes to the business judgment rule with the burden on the challenging party to
42
rebut the business judgment rule's presumption of propriety.
Conversely, if the board does not meet the enhanced scrutiny burden of first establishing that their decision was reasonable, the business judgment rule will not apply and the board will have to
demonstrate that the transaction was entirely fair to the
43
shareholders.
III.

DEFENSIVE

MrASURES-

UNOCAL'S ENHANCED SCRUTINY

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Delaware Supreme Court first enunciated the enhanced
scrutiny or intermediate standard of review in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.4 4 In Unocal, the court applied "enhanced scrutiny" to the

Unocal board's rejection of a hostile tender offer and adoption of a
selective self-tender offer. 45 The court adopted the two-prong en41. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1374 (finding that shareholders retain at all times
ultimate burden of persuasion, even when burden of proof shifts to directors after
rebuttal of business judgment rule) (citing Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774
(Del. 1990)); see also Uni-Marts, Inc. v. Stein, No. CIV.A.14713, 1996 WL 466961, at
*10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 1996) (commenting that in Unocal, "the Delaware Supreme
Court dilated upon the pleading and proof burdens in [a claim that the directors
are entrenching themselves in office] and held that when corporate action was
taken as a defensive step in the face of a threatened corporate takeover, directors
faced an inherent if somewhat attenuated conflict").
42. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1372-73 (stating that if shareholders do not rebut
presumption of business judgment rule, court will not substitute its judgment for
that of board if board's decision can be attributed to any rational purpose); Unocal,
493 A.2d at 957 ("If the board of directors is disinterested, has acted in good faith
and with due care, its decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion will be
upheld as a proper exercise of business judgment."). In Unitrin, the court stated
that in transactional justification cases, "[i]f the directors' actions withstand Unocal's reasonableness and proportionality review, the traditional business judgment
rule is applied to shield the directors' defensive decision rather than the directors
themselves." Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1374 (citingJoseph Hinsey, IV, BusinessJudgment
and the American Law Institute's CorporateGovernanceProject: The Rule, the Doctrine and
the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 609, 611-13 (1984)).
43. See A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A. 2d 103,
114-15 (Del. Ch. 1986) (applying entire fairness standard when directors failed to
meet enhanced scrutiny standard).
44. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
45. Id. at 954-55 (describing proper standard of review in assessing defensive
measures that board employed). Mesa, a 13% stockholder of Unocal, offered
Unocal a two-tiered, all-cash, front-loaded tender offer for 37% of UnoLal's stock
at $54 per share. See id. at 949. After thorough investigation, the board rejected
Mesa's offer as wholly inadequate and began planning a self-tender exchange of-
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hanced scrutiny test which requires that the board demonstrate
that: (1) it reasonably perceived that a threat to corporate policy or
effectiveness existed; and (2) its response was reasonable in relation
to the threat posed. 46 As the Delaware Supreme Court noted: "Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interest, rather than those of the corporation and
its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protection of the business
judgment rule may be conferred." 4 7 If the board meets the twoprong Unocal burden, the court will then review the board's decision under the business judgment rule standard with the burden of
fer. See id. at 950. After consideration of expert financial and legal advice, the
directors unanimously approved the exchange offer at a share price of $72 per
share and agreed to exclude Mesa from the self-tender proposal. See id. at 951.
According to their plan, as soon as Mesa acquired 37% of the Unocal stock, Unocal would buy the remaining 49% of its outstanding shares, excluding Mesa from
the offer. See id.
46. Id. at 955 (deciding whether board had power to act by using proportionality test). The Delaware Supreme Court stated that T. Boone Pickens, a noted
"greenmailer," controlled Mesa. See id. at 949 n.1, 956 ("Wholly beyond the coercive aspect of an inadequate two-tier tender offer, the threat was posed by a corporate raider with a national reputation as a 'greenmailer.'"). The court further
defined "greenmail" as "the practice of buying out a takeover bidder's stock at a
premium that is not available to other shareholders in order to prevent the takeover." Id. at 956 n.13. Hence, because Mesa had a reputation for being a corporate raider, the board properly perceived a threat to the corporation. See id. at 956
(noting that offers such as Mesa's are well-recognized threats at takeover attempts). The court noted that Unocal responded with the self-tender because of
the inadequate offer and wished to provide the remaining shareholders with an
alternative, rather than to be forced to accept junk bonds. See id. at 957. The
court further held that the board's response, the self-tender offer, was reasonably
related to the threat posed because the board acted to insure that its minority
shareholders could receive the substantial equivalent in value of what they owned
before the tender offer. See id. at 956 ("[T]he minority stockholder shall receive
the substantial equivalent in value of what he had before." (citing Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 114 (Del. 1952)); see also Unitrin, 651 A.2d at
1373 (fulfilling both parts of enhanced scrutiny standard required before business
judgment rule attaches); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d
1140, 1154 (Del. 1990) (same); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding Co.,
506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (same); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346, 1355-57 (Del. 1985) (same); A.C. Acquisitions, 519 A.2d at 114-15 (noting that
failure to meet second prong of enhanced scrutiny results in application of "entire
fairness" standard of review because directors violated their duty of loyalty).
47. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. The court also noted:
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to
determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders. In that respect a board's duty is no different from
any other responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less
entitled to the respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of
business judgment.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179 (noting that management of
business and affairs of corporation is ultimate responsibility of board).
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proof on the challenging party to rebut the rule's presumption of
propriety. 48 If the board does not meet both prongs of the Unocal
threshold test, it must then prove that its decision was entirely fair
49
to the corporation and its stockholders.
A.

Reasonably Perceiving a Threat to CorporatePolicy and Effectiveness

In order to meet their burden under Unocal, the directors must
first show "that the board of directors had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed. 50° The threat may be either actual (that is, presently existing)
or perceived (that is, one that could reasonably arise in the future) .51 The Delaware Supreme Court has held that a board satis48. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1374 ("If the directors' actions withstand Unocal's
reasonableness and proportionality review, the traditional business judgment rule
is applied to shield the directors' defensive decision." (citing Hinsey, supra note 42,
at 611-13)).
49. See A.C. Acquisitions, 519 A.2d at 114 (applying entire fairness standard
when directors failed td meet enhanced scrutiny standard).
50. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (deciding directors must first demonstrate reasonable ground for believing danger existed, then show that defensive measure used
was reasonable in light of danger posed); cf Uni-Marts, Inc. v. Stein, No.
CIV.A.14713, 1996 WL 466961, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 1996) (describing Unocal
as arguably shareholder friendly); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco, Inc., 551
A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988) (describing Unocal as "the most innovative and
promising case in any recent corporation law"). The court in Unocal instituted a
heightened scrutiny because of the possibility of a conflict of interest among a
corporation's directors; therefore, the threat must target corporate policy and effectiveness in order for a board to validly enact defensive measures. Unocal, 793
A.2d at 955; accord Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (describing first
prong of Unocal as questioning whether potential conflict of interest exists).
51. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350-53 (applying enhanced scrutiny to adoption
of rights plan in contemplation of some yet undefined threat to corporation); In re
Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A.14616, 1996 WL 752356,
at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1996) (stating that Delaware law is "settled that a board's
precautionary adoption of a defensive device is subject to enhanced scrutiny").
But see Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc., No. CIV.A.9813, 1988 WL
46064, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (applying "entire fairness" standard and not
enhanced scrutiny when, months before threat of tender offer, board adopted officer compensation plans to benefit themselves in event of change of control).
For example, General Motors' (GM) shareholders alleged that the board's
decision to repurchase H. Ross Perot's stock was the result of board entrenchment
in Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 185 (Del. 1985). The shareholders claimed that
the repurchase "was carried out principally to save GM's Board from further public
embarrassment by Perot." Id. The court held that the plaintiffs did not plead
sufficient facts to show that Perot threatened the board's policy or effectiveness,
and therefore, enhanced scrutiny did not apply. See id. at 188 (noting that because
Perot only owned 0.8% of GM's voting stock, any threats made by him could not
possibly effect GM's policy or effectiveness).
The court in Moran stated that "in reviewing a pre-planned defensive mechanism it seems even more appropriate to apply the business judgment rule." Moran,
500 A.2d at 1350 (defining preplanned mechanism as one that is "adopted to ward
off possible future advances and not a mechanism adopted in reaction to a specific
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fies its burden of proving reasonableness under the first prong of
Unocal by showing reasonable investigation and good faith. 5 2 The
directors must show that they took reasonable care and honestly
concluded that a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness was
present. 53 Not surprisingly, approval by a majority of independent,
outside directors materially enhances the board's burden in satisfy-

ing reasonableness under the first prong because there is only a
small possibility that the independent, outside director acted primarily to retain the power and privileges of being a director. 54
threat"). The board in Moran adopted a rights plan after it became concerned
about the corporation's vulnerability in the takeover context. Id. at 1349. The
announcement of a tender offer for more than 30% of Household's shares or the
acquisition of 20% of its shares by a single entity would trigger the rights plan. See
id. at 1348. The court noted that the plaintiff adequately demonstrated that the
adoption of the rights plan was in reaction to "what it perceived to be the threat in
the market place of coercive two-tier tender offers." Id. at 1356 (applying enhanced Unocal standard before board could enjoy presumptions of business judgment rule).
52. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
53. See id. at 956 (holding that two-stage, front-loaded cash offer for 37% of
company stock for inadequate price is coercive); see also Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. 1987) (describing how reputation and statements by suitors allowed Newmont's board to take defensive actions);
Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., No. CIV.A.9569, 1988 WL 23945, at
*5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1988) (stating in securities filings that suitor "might seek to
acquire control . . . through a tender offer or a proxy solicitation [although] it
remained willing to pursue acquisition negotiations"). Courts also consider an offeror's partial, front-loaded tender offer a threat if the shareholders feel compelled to tender to avoid being treated unfavorably. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575
A.2d 1131, 1145 (Del. 1990) (finding that coercive two-stage tender offer is "serious" threat to shareholders). Moreover, a threat may exist if the shareholders are
not aware of substantial technological or other confidential innovations achieved
by the target that will result in the tendering of shares at an inadequate price. See
Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1560 (D. Del. 1995)
("The favorable results from the board's past actions are now beginning to be
translated into financial results which even surpass management and financial analyst projections, and the financial data which manifests these results are factsknown only to [the directors]."); Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375 (finding that inadequate price proposed to uninformed shareholders in hostile offer created threat);
see also Kahn v. Roberts, 679 A.2d 460, 466 (Del. 1996) (finding that repurchase of
disgruntled shareholders' interest did not create actual threat to corporate control, and therefore, no enhanced scrutiny applied). Similarly, when a nonhostile
offer requires the consent of the target board, there is no threat to corporate policy or effectiveness. See Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 124041 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding that tender offer conditioned on target board's approval was not "threat"). Additionally, if consummation of a transaction results in
the violation of a federal antitrust or state regulation, a threat to corporate policy
or effectiveness is not likely. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375 (failing to dispute Chancery Court's finding that threat created by possible violation of antitrust or state
regulations was nothing more than "makeweight excuse" for defensive action).
54. See Polk, 507 A.2d at 537 (stating that presence of 10 outside directors with
investment and legal advice constituted prima facie showing of reasonableness);
See also Unitrin,651 A.2d at 1375 ("An 'outside' director has been defined as a non-
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Reasonably Responding to That Threat

Once the board establishes that it reasonably perceived a
threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, the board must then
show that its response was reasonable in relation to the threat
posed. 55 In this context, a reasonable response is one that is proportionate to the magnitude of the threat.5 6 The court has identiemployee and non-management director. Independence 'means that a director's
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather
than extraneous considerations or influences.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984))); Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc.,
No. CIV.A.7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *13 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) (holding that vote
by all outside directors coupled with advice of legal and financial counsel constituted prima facie showing of good faith and reasonable investigation to believe
threat existed).
55. See Unocal 493 A.2d at 955 ("A further aspect is the element of balance.").
56. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1389-90 (delineating test Chancery Court should
use to determine whether board's defensive response was reasonable). The Chancery Court, on remand, must review the nonselective repurchase of all shares to
determine its reasonableness, taking into consideration whether: (1) it was a statutorily authorized form of business decision that the board of directors may routinely make in a nontakeover context; (2) as a defensive response, it was limited
and corresponded in degree or magnitude to the degree or magnitude of the
threat (i.e., assuming the threat was relatively "mild"); and (3) the board properly
recognized that all shareholders were not alike, and provided immediate liquidity
to those shareholders who wanted it. .See id. at 1389.
The courts have held that when a board has acted defensively to protect its
shareholders or provide them with an alternative to the threat, the board has satisfied the Unocal standard, and thus, should enjoy the protection of the business
judgment rule. See id. at 1376 (holding that redemption of poison pill to protect
shareholders from "low ball" bid was reasonable); see also Gilbert, 575 A.2d at 1146
(holding that meeting with bankers and lawyers to discuss proposed takeover and
initiating exhaustive search for better option for its shareholders was reasonable);
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. 1990) (holding that delay
of annual meeting that was consistent with bylaws and Delaware law in response to
possible proxy fight and tender offer was reasonable); Polk, 507 A.2d at 573 n.3
(noting use of greenmailing was permitted under Unocal when it quashed immediate and long-term disruptive effect posed by dissident's action and was beneficial
to stockholders); Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 496 (Del. Ch.) (finding
that adopting bylaw amendment to delay shareholder vote for purpose of informing shareholders was reasonable response), affid, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995); In re
Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., 564 A.2d 342, 351-52 (Del. Ch. 1989) (stating that redemption of poison pill to prevent shareholder vote from being blocked
was reasonable response to protect shareholder interest in pending merger agreement); In re Damon Corp. Stockholders Litig., Nos. CIV.A.10173, 10189, 1988 WL
96192, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (holding that adoption of rights plan in
response to all-cash tender offer was reasonable and that "[t] he test of whether a
particular defense mechanism or a series of defense mechanizing are reasonable
therefore is predicated on whether the tender offer price is fair to the stockholders
and the directors' action is not tainted by any impropriety"). Additionally, when
the board sought to protect corporate policy, the board has satisfied the heightened standard as well. See Henley, 1988 WL 23945, at *15 (holding distributing
payment in kind debentures was matter of corporate policy that permitted stockholders to realize liquid value of company and was not unreasonable to threat of
two-step takeover transaction).
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fled several factors that help to determine whether the board's
response was reasonable, including:
the adequacy and terms of the offer; its fairness and feasibility; the proposed or actual financing for the offer, and
the consequences of that financing; questions of illegality;
the impact of both the bid and the potential acquisition of
other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests; the risk
of nonconsummation; the basic stockholder interests at
stake; the bidder's identity, prior background and other
business venture experiences; and the bidder's business
plans for the corporation and their effects on stockholder
57
interests.
When the board adopts multiple defensive measures, the court
will scrutinize those measures individually and collectively to determine whether they were a reasonable response to the perceived
threats. 58 The second prong of the enhanced scrutiny test does not
focus on whether the board's actions were "necessary" or the best
57. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del.
1989) (noting factors considered in assessing whether bidder is "reputable and
responsible").
58. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1386-87 (noting that singular actions alone may
not be disproportionate, but taken as whole will rise to level of unreasonable). In
Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that in light of Mesa's coercive twotiered, grossly inadequate offer, the Unocal board's self-tender, which excluded
Mesa, was appropriate. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (stating board's response
should offer shareholders more valuable economic alternative, including, at minimum, choice for shareholders). CompareBass Group, 552 A.2d at 1243-44 ("Under
Unocalthe directors were obligated to give the shareholders a choice. The restructuring, because it deprives them of that choice, is manifestly unreasonable."), with
A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch.
1986) (finding that, in response to hostile tender offer, directors acted reasonably
in providing shareholder with self-tender restructuring choice, but that this choice
was coercive and ineffective and accordingly, directors failed to meet second prong
of Unocal enhanced scrutiny).
In Gilbert, in response to a back-end, freeze out merger, the El Paso board
sought a better option for its shareholders. Gilbert, 575 A.2d at 1146 (pointing to
El Paso board's attempt to negotiate better protection for stockholders). Once the
break-up of the corporation became apparent, the board had the duty to maximize
shareholder value, hence it renegotiated the earlier offer, received better terms for
all shareholders and tendered its shares in the subsequent offer. See id. (holding
that board's response met enhanced Unocalstandard, and therefore, board could
receive benefit of business judgment rule). The court has also held that a board's
amendment of its bylaws to extend the minimum time for calling a shareholderinitiated special meeting in opposition to a proxy contest was "proportional" to the
threat, given that the bylaw amendment only delayed and did not prevent a stockholder vote. See Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 497 (noting that action "clearly fell within a
range of reasonable alternatives" and was "an extremely mild response to the
threat").
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possible options. Rather, the defensive measure need only be
"within a range of reasonableness" to satisfy Unoca's proportionality
59
prong.
In Kidsco, hostile suitor SoftKey International, Inc. announced a tender offer
to acquire a majority of The Learning Company's ("TLC") outstanding shares for
cash, to be followed by a stock-for-stock merger. See id. at 486-87. To further its
tender, SoftKey simultaneously announced that it would solicit proxies to call a
special shareholders meeting of TLC to replace TLC's directors with SoftKey nominees. See id. at 487. In response, the TLC board amended TLC's bylaws to extend
the minimum time for calling a stockholder-initiated special meeting from 35 to 60
days. See id. at 487-89. As a result of that amendment, a shareholder meeting to
replace the TLC board could not take place until approximately 25 days after a
more favored transaction had been considered by TLC stockholders. See id. at 48890. The court, in finding the TLC board's defensive action reasonable and not
draconian, held that the delay enabled the TLC board to present the favored transaction without the distraction of a concurrent proxy solicitation focused upon the
directors' incumbency. See id. at 496-97 (noting if favored transaction was not approved, additional time until shareholders' meeting would provide TLC board
with time to explore and develop alternative transactions on improved terms).
Similarly, the issuance of debentures as a responsive measure can be reasonable when it does not reduce any existing value or create new value in the corporation, even with restrictive covenants preventing leveraged acquisitions and
hindering an acquiror with substantial debt that cannot be subordinated. See Henley, 1988 WL 23945, at *12-14 (stating that issuance of debentures limited in time
and scope was reasonable to protect planned restructuring). Moreover, the divestiture of an attractive subsidiary at a profit is a reasonable response to a "creeping
tender offer." See Tomczak, 1990 WL 42607, at *10 (finding divestiture of profitable
subsidiary to be proportional and reasonable response). "[A] 'creeping tender
offer' is an 'acquisition device which avoids or minimizes the control premium
which a would-be acquiror is usually required to pay in a conventional tender offer."' Id. (quoting Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 577 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983)).
Finally, a poison pill rights plan alone may be neither preclusive or coercive and
may be reasonable if it enables the board to take concrete steps to protect and
advance the stockholder interests. See In re Holly Farms,564 A.2d at 351-53 (maintaining poison pill is reasonable response to threat posed by suitor's possible blockage of meaningful shareholder vote on merger agreement and until such time as
suitor's offer becomes competitive, rights plan served valid purpose); Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., No. CIV.A.10173, 1988 WL 383667, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (holding maintenance of poison pill appropriate when it is
integral to protect value of shareholders holdings). But see Grand Metro. Pub.,
Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1057-58 (Del. Ch. 1988) (failure to redeem
poison pill is unreasonable in relation to threat posed by noncoercive tender offer
when projected restructuring plan that may increase share value might never be
reality).
59. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1386 ("The Court of Chancery's determination
that the Unitrin Board's adoption of the Repurchase Program was unnecessary
constituted a substitution of its business judgment for that of the Board."). The
court in Paramountstated:
Although an enhanced scrutiny test involves a review of the reasonableness of the substantive merits of a board's actions, a court should not
ignore the complexity of the directors' task in a sale of control. There
are many business and financial considerations implicated in investigating and selecting the best value reasonably available. The board of directors is the corporate decisionmaking body best equipped to make those
judgments. Accordingly, a court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny
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In Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,60 the Delaware
Supreme Court refined the second prong of the enhanced scrutiny
standard to examine whether the defensive measure was "draconian. ' 61 A draconian response is per se outside of the range of reasonableness. In this context, a draconian response is one that is
either preclusive or coercive. 62 A preclusive defense is one that is
so effective that it would preclude a rational bidder from ever trying
to buy the company or attempt to gain control of the company
through a tender offer or proxy fight.63 A coercive defense forces
should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonabledecision, not
a perfect decision.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
1994) (emphasis added).
60. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995)
61. See id. at 1383-84 n.34 ("'Draconian, adj. Of or pert. to Draco, an archon
and member of the Athenian expatridae, or the code of laws which is said to have
been framed about 621 B.C. by him as thesmothete. In them the penalty for most
offenses was death, and to a later age they seemed so severe that they were said to
be written in blood. Hence, barbarously severe; harsh; cruel.'" (quoting WEBSTER'S
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 780 (2d ed. 1951))).
62. See id. at 1388 (holding that Unitrin's nonselective offer to repurchase all
shares was not coercive because it did not necessarily preclude future bids or proxy
contests by shareholders who declined to participate in purchase and generally did
not discriminate because all shareholders could voluntarily realiz same benefit by
selling). The Delaware Supreme Court stated that it must review Unitrin's actions,
including adoption of a poison pill rights plan, an advance notice bylaw and a
repurchase program for up to ten million shares of outstanding stock, on the basis
of whether they were preclusive and fell within the range of reasonable behavior.
See id. at 1389 (remanding to Chancery Court and requiring court to examine
whether nonselective offer to repurchase all shares was preclusive because hostile
bidder's chances of success would either be mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable).
As described in Unitrin, the proliferation of sophisticated takeover defenses
that have been upheld by courts, such as poison pills, "[have] resulted in such a
remarkable transformation in the market for corporate control that hostile bidders
who proceed when such defenses [were] in place will usually 'have to couple proxy
contests with tender offers.'" Id. at 1379 (quoting Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote
No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealingwith BarbariansInside the Gates, 45 Stan. L. REv.
857, 858 (1993)); see also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 n.7-8
(Del. 1985) (noting that poison pill rights plan usually involved issuance of warrants or preferred stock to favored shareholders that had more valuable exercise
or conversion rights in event of change in control, including allowing rights holder
to purchase shares of either surviving company or acquiror a%,substantial profit);
Dennis J. Block et al., ChancellorAllen, The Business Judgment Rule and the Shareholders'Right to Decide, 17 DEL. J. CoPe. L. 785, 825-26 n.274 (1992) (noting that it is
allowable to leave poison pill in place for reasonable time, while threat is present);
Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 30-31 (1987) (describing poison pill as effective defensive measure).
63. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387 (discussing holdings in Time and Moran in
which Delaware Supreme Court found that neither boards' actions were preclusive
because they did not stop acquiror from making offer and did not "strip" stockholders of right to receive tender offers).
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the board's plan on the shareholders. 64 If the defensive measure
adopted by the board is preclusive and/or coercive, it is per se unreasonable under Unocal's proportionality prong. In such cases,
the burden shifts to the board to establish that the defensive meas65
ures were entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.
If the defensive measure met the first prong of the enhanced
scrutiny test, was not draconian and fell in the range of reasonableness, the court applies the business judgment rule and places the
burden on the challenging party to rebut the business judgment
rule's presumptions of good faith, due care and loyalty. 66 If the
challenging party can rebut the presumption of propriety provided
by the business judgment rule, then the burden would shift back to
the board to establish that the decision it made was entirely fair to
the corporation. 67 For example, if outside influences or fraud
64. See id. (noting that Time offer did not have effect of "cramming down"
management-sponsored alternative on shareholders, and thus, was not coercive).
65. See A.C. Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113
(Del. Ch. 1986) (holding board's action unreasonable in response to threat
posed). In A.C. Acquisitions, BS/G made an all-cash, all-share tender offer to the
shareholders of A.C. Acquisitions for $56 dollars per share. Id. at 108-09. BS/G
also proposed a second-stage cash merger conditioned on the tender of the majority of A.C Acquisitions's outstanding stock, abandonment of A.C Acquisitions's
company transaction and approval by the board. See id. at 109., In response, the
A.C. Acquisitions board voted to reject the tender offer and to enact a self-tender
offer. See id. at 108. The court applied the Unocal standard. See id. at 112. The
court held that the self-tender served to further a corporate purpose, thereby fulfilling the first tier of the Unocal standard. See id. The court went on to hold that,
although a threat was posed by the BS/G offer, the self-tender did not constitute
an option to the stockholders, but rather it precluded the stockholders from accepting the BS/G offer, and therefore, the action by the A.C. Acquisition board
was unreasonable. See id. at 113; see also Grand Metro. Pub., Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co.,
558 A.2d 1049, 1061 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that poison pill adopted by board
removed any alternatives from shareholders and, thus, put their interest at stake
and was unreasonable response to threat posed); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v.
Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 124144 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that Unocal requires directors give shareholders options, but restructuring plan devised by board in response
to Bass Group offer deprived shareholders of that choice and was manifestly
unreasonable).
66. See Palm & Kearney, supra note 1, at 1300-16 (discussing triad of fiduciary
duties, what they are and how conduct satisfies duties); see also Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1986) (stating that court would not
substitute its judgment for board unless decisions were made with purpose of staying in office or as result of some other breach of fiduciary duty); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting effect of directors' breach of fiduciary duty
on applicability of business judgment rule). But see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (applying court's own judgment when parent company received benefit to exclusion of subsidiary).
67. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995)
(holding that when plaintiffs rebut presumption of business judgment rule, directors must prove "entire fairness"); Cede II, 634 A.2d 356, 361 (Del. 1993) (same);
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (holding that when plaintiffs

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 1

1062

VILLANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 1043

tainted the board's decision-making process or the primary motive
of the board was entrenchment, the business judgment rule would
not protect the board and the board would be obligated to prove
68
the entire fairness of its decision.
C.

When Does Unocal Apply?

One of the primary issues that arises is when should the court

apply Unocal? First, the action must be defensive and touch upon
issues of control.69 Second, the action must be the result of unilateral board action. 70 The board unilaterally acts when it reaches decisions "to the exclusion of, or in limitation upon, a valid
shareholder vote." 7 1 Hence, if the shareholders have specifically
72
and properly approved a defensive measure, Unocal will not apply.
Third, the Unocal standard applies only when a shareholder challenges the validity of the protective measure itself by seeking an
injunction to restrain the board from instituting or continuing the
defensive measure. In other words, Unocal applies only in "transacrebut presumption of business judgment rule, director's actions are reviewed
under entire fairness); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1284 (Del. 1989) (asking whether board was fully informed when it approved bid
because if not, directors may be misled and transaction cannot receive benefit of
business judgment rule).
68. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1371. For example, if the board's primary motivation in adopting the defensive measure in question is entrenchment, the business
judgment rule will not apply and the board will have to establish the entire fairness
of the defense. See id. at 1371 n.7 (noting that entire fairness standard applies if
presumption of business judgment rule is defeated); Unoca4 493 A.2d at 954 (noting that "[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interest . . . there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule
may be conferred"); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964) (noting that
evidence was inconsistent with finding that directors acted to maintain control);
Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962) (noting that when director acted
to preserve his control on board, burden was on directors "to justify [transaction]
as one primarily in the corporate interest").
69. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992) (expanding application of
Unocal beyond hostile contests to perceived threats to control); Gilbert v. El Paso
Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1136, 1144 (Del. 1990) (delineating that golden parachute
agreements, employee savings and stock ownership plans, and shareholder
supermajority voting provisions adopted after initiation of tender offer were defen-

sive); see also DENNISJ.
TIES OF CORPORATE

BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DuDIRECTORS 243-51 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995) (discussing

when board conduct is defensive).
70. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376-77 (Del. 1996) (requiring unilateral action by board in order for enhanced scrutiny to attach).
71. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 82.
72. See id. ("Under Delaware law a fully informed shareholder vote in favor of
a disputed transaction ratifies board action in the absence of fraud."). For an in
depth discussion of claim extinguishment, see infra notes 263-82 and accompanying text.
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tional justification" cases and not in any part of a case dealing with
the damages liability of a director for a board's decision. 7 3 The
business judgment rule, not Unocal, applies when a party is seeking
damages against the board for a decision that it has made even if
that decision involves the first two triggers of Unocal.7 4
The courts have not given any bright-line tests for distinguishing between defensive and nondefensive measures primarily because the question is so fact specific. 75 Courts will typically find
conduct defensive when the timing and purpose of the action indicate that the board is responding to a threat to its control. 76 The
courts, however, may also find the action defensive even when the
board's purpose was initially unrelated to any threat posed to corporate control, but subsequent events result in the mechanism having a defensive impact on a control situation. Timing, therefore, is
77
important.
73. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1374 (distinguishing between "transactional justification" cases and cases involving personal liability of directors).
74. See id. (clarifying when business judgment rule and when enhanced scrutiny apply). The court in Unitrin stated:
[I]n transactional justification cases involving the adoption of defenses to
takeovers, the director's actions invariably implicate issues affecting stockholder rights. In transactional justification cases, the directors' decision
is reviewed judicially and the burden of going forward is placed on the
directors. If the directors' actions withstand Unoca's reasonableness and
proportionality review, the traditional business judgment rule is applied
to shield the directors' defensive decision rather than the directors
themselves.
Id. (citations omitted).
75. See id. at 1372 (concluding that Court of Chancery properly found facts
and then proceeded to apply Unocat); see also Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176,
186 (Del. Ch. 1993) ("Thus, like most equity cases, resolution of issues of this sort
are highly particularized; factual.").
76. See American Gen. Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc., Nos. CIV.A.13656, CIV.A.13699,
1994 WL 698483, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994) (mem.) ("The timing of the
board's consideration and implementation of the repurchase program indicates
that the repurchase program has a defensive purpose."), rev'd, 651 A.2d 1361 (Del.
1995).
77. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154
(Del. 1990) (evaluating both Paramount's tender offer and revised agreement
under second prong of Unocal). The court affirmed the Chancellor's rulings and
explained:
Here, on the record facts, the Chancellor found that Time's responsive
action to Paramount's tender offer was not aimed at "cramming down"
on its shareholders a management-sponsored alternative, but rather had
as its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered
form. Thus, the response was reasonably related to the threat. The
Chancellor noted that the revised agreement and its accompanying safety
devices did not preclude Paramount from making an offer for the combined Time-Warner company or from changing the conditions of its offer
so as not to make the offer dependent upon the nullification of the TimeWarner agreement. Thus, the response was proportionate.
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When the primary purpose of the action is to thwart a change
of control, the Unocal standard also applies. 78 Additionally, the degree of existing control at the time is important in the court's analysis of whether a board acted defensively. 79 In short, the key to
avoiding Unocats enhanced standard is for the board to argue that
the board's actions are not defensive because they are not in reaction to an actual or perceived threat and they do not have the purpose of responding to a threat to corporate control.8 0
Two additional points should be kept in mind when dealing
with a Unocal claim. First, Unocal does not require that the board's
decision be perfect or the best decision possible; rather, the decision need only be reasonable. 81 Second, Unocal's enhanced scrutiny is very fact specific.8 2 As the Delaware Supreme Court
admonished in Unitrin: "The enhanced judicial scrutiny mandated
by Unocal is not intended to lead to a structured, mechanistic, mathematical exercise. Conversely, it is not intended to be an abstract
theory. The Unocal standard is a flexible paradigm that jurists can
Id.
78. See Glazer, 658 A.2d at 186 (noting that when terms were supportive of

raising capital, and "not of a masked corporate control purpose," Unocal did not
apply). Compare Packer v. Yampol, No. CIV.A.8432, slip op. at 39 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18,
1986) (stating that supervoting preferred stock gave corporate president control of
44% of voting power and, although corporation stated that its purpose was to raise
capital, court found primary purpose was to obstruct proxy contest), with Glazer,
658 A.2d at 186 (finding that sale of securities package carrying 17% of corporation's voting power to affiliate after shareholder obtained 40% of corporate stock
was not defensive because board contemplated stock issuance for over one year).
79. See Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. CIV.A.7861, 1990 WL 42607, at
*9 (Del. Ch.Apr. 5, 1990) (examining degree to which potential suitor infringed
on board control). In Tomczak, a board decided to sell a division of the corporation to a shareholder who owned eight percent. Id. The court applied the Unocal
standard and stated that the board's actions satisfied this enhanced scrutiny. See id.
at *9-10 (noting sale had at least purpose of removing threat of possible takeover).
The Delaware Supreme Court in a later case, however, held that the Unocal standard did not apply to the board's adoption of a general option agreement giving
the controlling shareholder family a right of first refusal to purchase any shares
offered to people outside of the family. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 83 (Del.
1992). The Stroud court held that because three directors owned over 50% of the
corporation, they had control of the corporation in fact, and in law, therefore, the
corporation was not a takeover target. Id. (refusing to apply Unocal standard).
80. See Glazer, 658 A.2d at 186 (finding acts nondefensive). See generally BNS,
Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) (recognizing as
nondefensive board's right to extend date when rights detach from tender offer).
81. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385-86 (Del.
1995) (explaining that enhanced judicial scrutiny requires determination of
whether directors made reasonable decision, not perfect decision).
82. For a discussion of the fact-specific nature of the determination of
whether a board's decision is reasonable, see supra note 75-77 and accompanying
text.
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apply to the myriad of 'fact scenarios' that confront corporate
83
boards."
The application of Unocal in the typical case in which a challenging party seeks an injunction is clear only if each party's burden
is understood. The party seeking the injunction has the burden of
establishing that an injunction is appropriate.8 4 In order to do so,
the party seeking the injunction must establish a reasonable
85
probability of success on the merits if the case goes to trial.
In order for the Unocal enhanced scrutiny to apply, the challenging party must first establish that the board unilaterally
86
adopted a defensive measure that touched upon issues of control.
If the challenging party is unable to show that the board's action
triggered Unocal, then the presumptions of the business judgment
unilat-,
rule apply.8 7 If, however, the challenging party establishes
eral board adoption of a defensive measure touching on issues of
control, then the directors have the burden of meeting Unoca's
two-prong test.8 8
At that point, the board must demonstrate that it reasonably
perceived a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, and the
defensive measure was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.8 9
If the board presents no evidence or does not meet its burden
under Unoca, then the board could nevertheless win the lawsuit if it

83. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (citations omitted).
84. See id. at 1371 (noting that to succeed in preliminary injunction motion,
plaintiff must establish that there is "a reasonable probability of irreparable harm"
and that harm imposed on plaintiff "outweighs the harm to the defendant").
85. See id.
86. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992) (expanding application of
Unocal beyond hostile contests to perceived threats to control); Gilbert v. El Paso
Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1136, 1144 (Del. 1990) (delineating that golden parachute
agreements, employee savings and stock ownership plans, and shareholder
supermajority voting provisions adopted after initiation of tender offer were defensive); BLOCK ET AL., supra note 69, at 243-51 (discussing when board conduct is
defensive).
87. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373 (discussing presumptions of business judgment rule and procedure for rebutting such presumptions).
88. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376-77 (Del. 1996) (requiring unilateral board action before Unocal standard attaches).
89. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)
(stating that because pending takeover bid necessarily placed board of directors in
conflict of interest, director "must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger ...existed" and "[i]f a defensive measure is to come within
ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed").
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demonstrates that the defensive measure satisfies the entire fairness

standard. 90
Alternatively, if the board meets the Unocal enhanced standard
of review, the board would then receive the protections of the business judgment rule. 9 1 In that case, the burden shifts back to the
challenging party to rebut the business judgment rule's presump92
tion that the board acted in good faith, with due care and loyalty.
If the challenging party is unsuccessful in rebutting the business
judgment rule's presumption, the board's decision would be upheld as long as it was not irrational. 93 Conversely, if the challenging
party successfully rebutted the business judgment rule by demonstrating that the board breached one or more of its fiduciary duties
owed to the corporation and its shareholders, then the burden
would shift back to the board to establish the entire fairness of the
defensive measure at issue. 9 4 When shareholders challenge director action in a sale of the company or a change of control transaction, similar issues arise but the board's goals change.
IV.

SALE OR CHANGE OF CONTROL-ENHANCED

UNOCAL DUTIES

IN THE REVLON MODE

When a board approves a transaction that results in the sale of
the corporation or a change of corporate control, the transaction is
subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny. 95 In these situations, the
courts require the board to act reasonably and seek the transaction
90. See Cinerama v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1180 (Del. 1995) [hereinafter Cede III] (holding that when board meets burden of showing entire fairness, board will defeat shareholder challenge); see also Palm & Kearney, supra note
1, at 1318-19 (discussing entire fairness standard).
91. See Cede II1, 663 A.2d at 1162 (holding that when plaintiffs rebut presumption of business judgment rule, directors must prove entire fairness); Unitrin, 651
A.2d at 1371 n.7 (noting that entire fairness applies when business judgment rule
is rebutted); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (same); A.C.
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(applying entire fairness standard when directors failed to meet enhanced scrutiny
standard).
92. See Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("To rebut the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary
duty-good faith, loyalty or due care.").
93. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971) (noting that
board's decisions "will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational
business purpose").
94. See Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1162 (holding that when business judgment rule's
presumption is rebutted by proof of breach of triad of fiduciary duties, corporation must prove transaction was entirely fair).
95. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
44 (Del. 1994).
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that offers the best value available to the shareholders. 96 Several
Delaware Supreme Court decisions have discussed the board's fidu-

ciary duties in the sale or change of control context. 97 One of the
most significant cases is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.98 In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that in the
event of a sale of the corporation, the directors must maximize the
99
current value of the shareholders' stock.

In Revlon, Pantry Pride initiated a hostile takeover attempt of
Revlon.1 00 The court first applied the enhanced Unocal standard to
the board's initial defensive attempts to rebuff the hostile takeover

attempts by Pantry Pride. 10 1 Subsequently faced with the choice of
sale of the company by either a hostile takeover by Paitry Pride or a
friendly leveraged buyout by Forstmann Little, the Revlon directors
10 2
chose to enter into the buyout agreement with Forstmann Little.
96. See id. ("In the sale of control context, the directors must focus on one
primary objective-to secure the transaction offering the best value reasonably
available for the stockholders."); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279,
1286 (Del. 1989) (holding that "the board must act in a neutral manner to encourage the highest possible price for shareholders"); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) ("The duty of the board...
[is] the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit."); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 459 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1970)
("[I] n a sale of corporate control the responsibility of the directors is to get the
highest value reasonably attainable for the shareholders.").
97. See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, No. CIV.A.15513, 1997 WL
225708, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1997) (holding that "most prominent" of cases
dealing with directors' duties in sale of control transaction was Revlon because
"that case had been widely thought to announce special directorial duties in the
event of a 'sale' of the corporation").
98. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
99. Id. at 182 (holding that, when it became apparent that sale of company
was pending, "duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon
as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
stockholder's benefit").
100. Id.
101. See id. at 180-81 (describing Revlon's plan to thwart hostile takeover attempt by Pantry Pride, through creation of "poison pill" plan and adoption of
exchange offer for ten million of its shares). Applying the Unocal test to these
defensive measures, the court concluded that the board's actions were reasonable
in light of the threat of a hostile takeover and were made on an informed basis. See
id. (explaining that Revlon directors concluded that Pantry Pride's offer was
grossly inadequate). After Pantry Pride increased its offer price, the Revlon directors considered a leveraged buyout proposal made by Forstmann Little that would
transfer ownership to the Revlon directors themselves. See id. at 178. The agreement with Forstmann Little provided for acquisition of 100% of Revlon's outstanding stock by Forstmann and the subsequent breakup of Revlon. See id.
102. See id. at 184 (explaining board's reason for accepting Forstmann Little
offer). The court explained:
While Forstmann's $57.25 offer was objectively higher than Pantry Pride's
$56.25 bid, the margin of superiority is less when the Forstmann price is
adjusted for the time value of money. In reality, the Revlon board ended
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The court held that when the sale of the company became inevitable, the board's role changed. 10 3 Instead of being "defenders of
the corporate bastion," the board became "auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company."

10

4

A.

The Basis for the Revlon Duty

The courts have given several reasons justifying an enhanced
scrutiny standard of review in sale and change of control transactions. First, such transactions frequently have a negative effect on
shareholder voting rights. 10 5 Second, the transaction typically re10 6
sults in the sale and loss of the shareholders' control premium.
A control premium recognizes not only the value of a control
block of shares, but also compensates the shareholders for their loss
the auction in return for very little actual improvement in the final bid.
The principal benefit went to the directors, who avoided personal liability

to a class of creditors to whom the board owed no further duty under the
circumstances.
Id.

103. See id. at 182 (discussing that, when breakup of company is inevitable,
"[tlhe duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a
corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit").
104. Id.
105. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,

42 (Del. 1994) ("When a majority of a corporation's voting shares are acquired by
a single person or entity, or by a cohesive group acting together, there is a significant diminution in the voting power of those who thereby become minority shareholders."). Delaware courts have consistently acted to protect stockholders from

interference with their voting rights by applying an enhanced judicial scrutiny standard to transactions that affect voting rights. See id. (explaining importance of
voting rights and court's willingness to protect shareholders from interference
with such rights). The court stated:
Under the statutory framework of the General Corporation Law, many of
the most fundamental corporate changes can be implemented only if
they are approved by a majority vote of the stockholders. Such actions
include elections of directors, amendments to the certificate of incorporation, mergers, consolidations, sales of all or substantially all of the assets
of the corporation, and dissolution.... Because of the overriding importance of voting rights, this Court and the Court of Chancery have consistently acted to protect shareholders from unwarranted interference with
such rights.
Id.
106. See id. The Paramountcourt stated:
Such scrutiny is mandated by: (a) the threatened diminution of current
shareholders' voting power; (b) the fact that an asset belonging to public
stockholders (a control premium) is being sold and may never be available again; and (c) the traditional concern of Delaware courts for actions

which impair or impede shareholder voting rights.
Id.; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. 459 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1970)
(explaining general concern of Delaware courts in sale of control transactions).
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of voting power. 10 7 Once control has shifted in a sale or change of
control transaction, the resulting minority stockholders will have no
ability to demand another control premium. 10 8 Therefore, the directors are obliged to "take the maximum advantage of the current
opportunity to realize for the stockholders the best value reasonably
available."' 09
Following the Revlon decision, questions arose as to what transactions trigger enhanced scrutiny under Revlon and what the responsibilities under Revlon specifically entail. 1 10 Some courts
interpreted Revlon as "limit[ing] the range of good faith business
judgment[s]" that a board might make once a sale or change of
corporate control was inevitable."' This regulatory approach led
to holdings generally requiring boards to conduct auctions, disallowing "lock-up" agreements and preventing boards from display12
ing favoritism among bidders without good cause.'
107. See Paramount, 637 A.2d at 43 (discussing protection of minority stockholders). The court defined a control premium:
The acquisition of majority status and the consequent privilege of exerting the powers of majority ownership come at a price. That price is usually a control premium which recognizes not only the value of a control
block of shares, but also compensates the minority shareholders for their
resulting loss of voting power.
Id.
108. See id. (explaining significance of control premiums in ParamountViacom transaction). The court stated, "[b] ecause of the intended sale of control,
the Paramount-Viacom transaction has economic consequences of considerable
significance to the Paramount stockholders. Once control has shifted, the current
Paramount stockholders will have no leverage in the future to demand another
control premium." Id.
109. Id. (holding that result of Paramount-Viacom transaction was that resulting shareholders were entitled to receive control premiums).
110. See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, No. CIV.A.15513, 1997 WL
225708, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1997) (holding that Revlon's "broad generalization masks more questions than it answers"). The court stated that the "meaning
of Revlon-specifically, when its special duties were triggered, and what those duties specifically required-were questions that repeatedly troubled the bench and
the bar in the turbulent wake of the Revlon decision." Id.
111. See id. ("One view of the holding in Revlon was that it was premised on a
duty ... that was different in some way from ordinary director duties: to act in
good faith pursuit of corporate welfare and to be informed and attentive."). The
court stated that "[o] n this view, once a 'sale' of the corporation was in contemplation, 'Revlon duties' would be thought to limit the range of good faith business
judgment that the board might make.., and afforded a reviewing court additional
(fairness) grounds in any judicial review of director action." Id.
112. See id. (citing examples of Delaware Supreme Court decisions which held
that, in sale of control transaction, directors' duties were altered, thereby requiring
them to perform and refrain from specific types of conduct); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1988) (interpreting Revlon
as holding that "no-shop" clause will not be allowed "[a] bsent a material advantage
to the stockholders").
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Other opinions interpreting Revlon focused on the necessity of
preserving the board's ability to make business judgments. 1 13 In
these cases, the Delaware Supreme Court based its decisions on
such factors as whether the board adequately informed itself and
whether it acted in good faith when it approved the transaction to
sell or to change corporate control. 114 In these cases, the court did
not interpret Revlon as requiring directors to follow a set formula or
to treat all bidders equally and "keep a level playing field." 115
Rather, courts merely required directors to comply with their basic
1 16
fiduciary duties while attempting to maximize shareholder value.
Courts thereby gave significant deference to directors in conducting a corporate sale as long as the board's decisions were rea117
sonably related to maximizing shareholder value.
B.

Maximizing Shareholder Value

In Paramount,Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.," 8 the court clarified
many of the remaining issues arising from the earlier cases. 119 The
court in Paramountheld that when a board approves a transaction
that results in a change of corporate control, such that the stockholders are no longer able to participate in a change of control
premium, the board must be reasonable and act in good faith in
obtaining the best offer reasonably available.' 20 The court in Para113. See Equity-Linked Investors, 1997 WL 225708, at *13 (holding that some
cases "tended to 'normalize' directors' duties in these important transactions; they
reflect greater deference to an independent board even in a 'sale' context, and
acknowledged the necessity of an independent board to make business judgment
even in that setting").
114. See id. ("[T]hese cases tended to evaluate board conduct... in terms of
the board's steps to be informed and its good faith.").
115. See TW Servs. Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos.CIV.A 10427, 10298,
1989 WL 20290, at *7, (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) ("[Tlhe so-called Revlon duty is not
necessarily a duty to conduct an 'auction' or to keep 'a level playing field' when
the firm is for sale,. . . or, indeed, to proceed in any prescribed way; rather, it is the
duty to exercise judgment (in good faith and prudently) in an effort to maximize
immediate share value.").
116. See Equity-Linked Investors, 1997 WL 225708, at *13 ("So long as it satisfied
a burden to show compliance with its basic duties-independence, good faith and
due attentiveness-the board's judgments would be respected.").
117. See id. ("Under this more business judgment like view, the board continued to possess substantial discretion with respect to conducting a sale.").
118. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
119. See Equity-Linked Investors, 1997 WL 225708, at *13 ("[The] existing uncertainty respecting the meaning of 'Revlon duties' was substantially dissipated by
the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Paramount.").
120. See id. (noting where directors' loyalties should be in change of control
situation). The court in Equity-Linked Investors summarized Paramount'sholding:
[Paramount] teaches a great deal, but it may be said to support these generalizations at least: (1) where a transaction constituted a "change in cor-
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mount held that a reasonableness standard of review would apply in
121
sale or change of control situations.
The Paramountholding represents a middle ground between
the earlier, arguably more regulatory interpretations of Revlon and
those interpretations that seemed more focused on preserving the
business judgment rule. 12 2 In reconciling these two arguably conflicting lines of cases, Paramountadopted an intermediate approach
that recognized the importance of allowing directors to make business judgments in a sale or change of control situation, so long as
the board acted reasonably in carrying out its duties of good faith,
123
care and loyalty to obtain the best available offer.
The court in Paramountalso stated that the directors must be
"especially diligent" when pursuing their duty to maximize shareholder value.' 24 Specifically, the board must adequately inform itself before negotiating a sale of control. 125 These methods may
porate control," such that the shareholders would thereafter lose a
further opportunity to participate in a change of control premium, (2)
the board's duty of loyalty requires it to try in good faith to get the best
price reasonably available (which specifically means that the board must
at least discuss an interest expressed by any financially capable buyer),
and (3) in such context courts will employ an (objective) "reasonableness" standard of review (both to the process and the result!) to evaluate
whether the directors have complied with their fundamental duties of
care and good faith (loyalty).
Id.
121. See Paramount,637 A.2d at 43 (holding that "[t]he courts will apply enhanced scrutiny to ensure that the directors will have acted reasonably").
122. See Equity-Linked Investors, 1997 WL 225708, at *13 (stating that Paramount
"in effect mediates between the 'normalizing' tendency of some prior cases and
the more highly regulatory approach of others").
123. See id. The court in Equity-Linked Investors stated that:
[Paramount] adopts an intermediate level of judicial review which recognizes the broad power of the board to make decisions in the process of
negotiating and recommending a "sale of control" transaction, so long as
the board is informed, motivated by good faith desire to achieve the best
available transaction, and proceeds "reasonably." Id.
124. See Paramount,637 A.2d at 44 (explaining required diligence of directors
when acting on behalf of corporation).
125. See id. (noting that Delaware Supreme Court "has stressed the importance of the board being adequately informed in negotiating a sale of control:
'The need for adequate information is central to the enlightened evaluation of a
transaction that a board must make."' (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 567 A. 2d
1279, 1287 (Del. 1989))) The court recognized that there are several methods
through which boards may fulfill their Revlon duty. See id. ("Delaware law recognizes that there is 'no single blueprint' that directors must follow." (citations omitted) ; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285-86 (Del.
1988) (explaining, for example, that "[d]irectors are not required by Delaware law
to conduct an auction according to some standard formula, only that they observe
the significant requirement of fairness for the purpose of enhancing general shareholder interests"). The court stated that the Revlon duty "does not preclude differing treatment of bidders when necessary to advance [shareholder] interests.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 1
1072

VILIANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 1043

include, but do not always require that the board conduct an auction or canvass the market. 126 In addition, the court considered
participation from independent, outside directors an important factor because of the potential management bias towards a particular
127
offeror.
In all cases, the board's clear objective must be to inform itself
of all of the material information that is reasonably available to determine what alternative provides the best value to the stockholders.1 28 In determining what alternative provides the greatest value
for the shareholders, the board can consider factors other than the
total dollar amount of the offer, including the offer's fairness, the
type of financing behind the offer, information concerning the bid129
der and the likelihood of consummating the deal.
Thus, if a shareholder challenges a transaction that triggers the
Revlon responsibilities, courts perform an enhanced scrutiny test to
determine the reasonableness of the board's decisions. 130 The
Variables may occur which necessitate such treatment. However, the board's primary objective, and essential purpose, must remain the enhancement of the bidding process for the benefit of the stockholders." Id. at 1286-87.
126. See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286-87 (explaining some of methods by which
boards can fulfill their Revlon duties).
127. See Paramount,637 A.2d at 44 ("Moreover, the role of outside, independent directors becomes particularly important because of the magnitude of a sale of
control transaction and the possibility, in certain cases, that management may not
necessarily be impartial.").
128. See id. at 44-45 ("While the assessment of these factors may be complex,
the board's goal is straightforward: Having informed themselves of all material
information reasonably available, the directors must decide which alternative is
most likely to offer the best value reasonably available to the stockholders.").
129. See id. ("In determining which alternative provides the best value for the
stockholders, a board of directors is not limited to considering only the amount of
cash involved and is not required to ignore totally its view of the future value of a
strategic reliance."). The court in Paramount stated that
the directors should analyze the entire situation and evaluate in a disciplined manner the consideration being offered. Where stock or other
non-cash consideration is involved, the board should try to quantify its
value, if feasible, to achieve an objective comparison of the alternatives.
In addition, the board may assess a variety of practical considerations relating to each alternative, including: "[an offer's] fairness and feasibility;
the proposed or actual financing for the offer, and the consequence of
that financing; questions of illegality;.., the risk of nonconsum[m]ation;
... the bidder's identity, prior background and other business venture
experiences; and the bidder's business plans for the corporation and
their effects on stockholder interests."
Id. (quoting Mills, 559 A.2d at 1282 n.29).
130. See id. 637 A.2d at 45 (holding that board action subject to enhanced
scrutiny when stockholder voting power was threatened and when control premium was being sold and may never be available again). The court noted that two
key aspects of enhanced scrutiny test are "(a) a judicial determination regarding
the adequacy of the decisionmaking process employed by the directors, including
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court in Paramountstressed that because of the intricacies involved
in a sale or change of control transaction, the board's decision

need not be perfect. Instead, the board's decision must be reasonable under the circumstances that existed when the decision was
made. 13 1 As long as the board's decision was reasonable when
1 32
made, the courts will not question that decision.
C.

When Does Revlon Apply?

Before a court will apply enhanced scrutiny in this context, a
plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing that the transaction
will result in the sale or change of control of the company. 133 In
Paramount,the Delaware Supreme Court held that there are generally two scenarios that trigger enhanced scrutiny review under Revlon: (1) when a corporation initiates an active bidding process in
an attempt to sell itself or breakup the company and (2) when a
corporation responds to a bidder's offer by abandoning its13long4
term strategy in an attempt to sell or breakup the company.
the information on which the directors based their decisions; and (b) a judicial
examination of the reasonableness of the directors' action in light of the circumstances then existing." Id.
131. See id. (applying same reasonableness standard that is applied in change
of control situations). The court stated:
Although an enhanced scrutiny test involves a review of the reasonableness of the substantive merits of a board's actions, a court should not
ignore the complexity of the directors' task in a sale of control. There
are many business and financial considerations implicated in investigating and selecting the best value reasonably available. The board of directors is the corporate decisionmaking body best equipped to make those
judgments. Accordingly, a court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny
should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonabledecision, not
a perfect decision.
Id. (emphasis added).
132. See id. ("If a board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court
should not second-guess that choice even though it might have decided otherwise
or subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board's determination.").
133. See In re Wheelabrator Tech. Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A. 11495,
1992 WL 212595, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992) (holding that challenging party
must prove that Revlon applies).
134. See Paramount, 637 A.2d at 47 (discussing application of Revlon duties).
The court explained what actions trigger Revlon duties:
Under Delaware law there are, generally speaking and without excluding
other possibilities, two circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties.
The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation initiates an active bidding
process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a
clear breakup of the company. However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its longterm strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the breakup
of the company.
Id. (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(Del. Ch. 1990)).
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In the first situation, the active bidding process must make it
inevitable that the target company will be sold to one of the competing bidders. 135 A sale is "inevitable" when a corporation's board
solicits bids for the sale of the company after recognizing'that the
company is the likely target of a hostile takeover.1 3 6 Actions such as
merger agreements, however, do not necessarily indicate an inevita13 7
ble sale and do not alone trigger enhanced judicial scrutiny.
Thus, a sale of control is not necessarily inevitable any time a company enters into a business combination or acquisition agreement
13 8
with another company.
135. See id. at 46 ("The decisions of this Court following Revlon reinforced the
applicability of enhanced scrutiny and the director's obligations to seek the best
value reasonably available for the stockholders where there is a pending sale of
control, regardless of whether or not there is to be a breakup of the
corporation.").
136. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284-87 (Del.
1988) (holding that Revlon duties were triggered when Macmillan board, after recognizing that company was likely target for hostile takeover bid, formally authorized Macmillan's investment advisors to explore sale of company); see also Citron v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 67-69 (Del. 1989) (holding
that Revlon duties were triggered once board "shopped the company" to potential
buyers after concluding that it would be in best interests of stockholders to sell
company).
137. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1151 (refusing to extend Revlon's application to
corporate transactions "simply because they might be construed as putting a corporation either 'in play' or 'up for sale'"). In Ivanhoe Partnersv. Newmont Mining
Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch. 1987), Newmont's board of directors allowed its largest stockholder to attempt a street sweep in order to prevent a hostile takeover by
Ivanhoe. See id. The court held that the sole fact that Ivanhoe solicited a friendly
investor to own 49% of its stock in an attempt to thwart a hostile takeover did not
alone trigger Revlon duties. See id. (holding that friendly investor was not "bidder"
because investor's "primary desire was to protect its investment in Newmont, not to
acquire and operate that company").
138. See Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., No. CIV.A.12883, 1993 WL
526781, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1993) (noting that combination or agreement
can keep directors in control, and therefore, directors can still focus on long-term
goals of company), rev'd on other grounds, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994). In Arnold, the
court applied the two-category test used in Time and found that the company's
actions did not trigger a duty under either category. See id. Specifically, the court
found that the company's "deliberate choice to pursue.., long-term business and
recovery options" removed the company from the auction block, and moreover,
there was no change of control here that would trigger Revlon. See id. at *10-11
(considering following factors in determining whether such market existed: (1)
both companies were publicly owned; (2) one individual or entity did not own
large controlling block of shares in either company; and (3) nothing suggested
that "continuity of Bancorp's shareholders in the merged entity is threatened").
For example, a sale of only a division of a company is not necessarily evidence of a
future change of control. See Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. CIV.A.7861,
1990 WL 42607, at *15 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) (holding that Revlon duty was not
triggered because sale of division of Thiokol "did not constitute the sale of the
entire company, or even most of the company, nor was [the company] seeking to
effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company").

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss4/1

32

Palm and Kearney: A Primer on the Basics of Directors' Duties in Delaware: The Rule
1997]

THE BAsIcs OF DIREcToRs' DUTIES IN DELAWARE

1075

Though the Paramount board did not have the subjective intent to sell or breakup the company, the "Paramount board, albeit

unintentionally, had initiated an active bidding process seeking to
sell itself by agreeing to sell control of the corporation to Viacom in
circumstances where another potential acquiror (QVC) was equally

interested in being a bidder." 139 In Paramount, a sale of control
took place because the transaction would have transferred control
of Paramount to a single individual, Viacom's majority shareholder. 140 On the other hand, no change of control transaction or
sale occurs when "an aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders own
the corporation before the transaction, and a different aggregation
of unaffiliated shareholders" own the corporation after the consum141
mation of the transaction.
139. Paramount,637 A.2d at 47-51 (finding that sale of control occurred and
applying Revlon duties). In mid-1993, Viacom and Paramount signed a merger
agreement replete with defensive provisions, including a $100 million termination
fee, a no-shop provision limiting Paramount's ability to consider other deals and a
"lock-up" provision giving Viacom the right to purchase up to 20% of Paramount's
stock, at then-existing market prices, if the deal was not completed. See id. at 39.
About one month after the merger announcement, QVC announced a substantial
tender offer for 51% of Paramount's stock. See id. at 40. In response, Viacom and
Paramount amended their merger agreement and Viacom commenced a tender
offer for Paramount's shares without modification of its defensive provisions. See
id. at 40-41. A "bidding war" ensued and Paramount's board rejected QVC's
tender, arguing that the QVC offer was excessively conditional and that the
Viacom offer "would be more advantageous to Paramount's future business prospects than a QVC transaction." Id. at 41. QVC sued to enjoin consummation of
the Viacom tender offer, and the court issued a preliminary injunction that
stopped the Paramount-Viacom deal. See id.
140. Id. at 43 (explaining that, in event of Paramount-Viacom transaction,
there would be single controlling stockholder who would have ultimate voting
power).
141. See id. (concluding that Revlon duties were triggered because proposed
sale of control would have removed control of corporation from "fluid aggregation
of unaffiliated stockholders"). Before a court will apply Revlon's enhanced scrutiny, a plaintiff must prove that a transaction will cause a change of control, even
though it is not always clear if a single person, entity or group will control the
corporation until after a transaction occurs. See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholders Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995) (dismissing Revlon claim because plaintiff did not allege that control, after transaction, would not remain "in a large,
fluid, changeable and changing market"). If a stockholder's ownership of a corporation following a transaction is less than 50%, personal and/or commercial relationships between the shareholder and the board of directors may be sufficient to
support a finding of future control. See In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319,
328-29 (Del. 1993) (holding that stockholder who owned only 36.8% of company
but had commercial agreements with directors could exercise effective control
over company). The plaintiff proved that the stockholder had relationships with
the board of directors which indicated that the stockholder had dominion over the
board. See id. Absent these relationships though, the Delaware courts have not
found that shareholders owning less than 50% of a corporation will presumably
obtain control. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 111314 (Del. 1994) (holding that "'shareholder who owns less than 50% of a corpora-
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A board's action also triggers Revlon when, in response to a
bidder's offer, a target company abandons its long-term strategy
and attempts to sell or breakup the company. 142 When the board
chooses to sell the company, it is giving up its control and no longer
has a long-term interest in corporate policy and effectiveness.
Therefore, when courts apply the duty to maximize shareholder
value in the company, the board can only look to short-term interests. 14 3 If a board of directors abandons the corporation's continued existence and decides to sell the company in response to a
hostile tender offer, then the courts will apply the enhanced Unocal
standard and the board must maximize shareholder value.1 44 If,
however, the board merely adopts defensive measures that do not
result in the breakup of the company or sale of corporate control,
the courts will apply the enhanced Unocal duties to determine if the
1 45
board acted reasonably to protect the corporation.
tion's outstanding stocks does not, without more, become a controlling shareholder of that corporation, with a concomitant fiduciary status'" (quoting Citron,
569 A.2d at 70)). To establish a relationship between a shareholder and the directors, the plaintiff must prove that the directors subverted their judgment to serve
the personal conflicting interests of the "controlling" shareholder. See Kahn, 638
A.2d at 1113-14 (stating that, for plaintiffs to establish such relationship, they must
"allege domination by a minority shareholder through actual control of corporation conduct"); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (holding that in
order to establish directors' lack of independence, plaintiff must show that directors were "beholden" to shareholders).
142. See Paramount,637 A.2d at 47 (rejecting defendant's argument that both
change of control and breakup were required to trigger Revlon). The court stated:
Such a holding would unduly restrict the application of Revlon.... There
are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders
than a sale of control or a corporate breakup. Each event represents a
fundamental (and perhaps irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from a practical standpoint. It is the significance of
each of these events that justifies: (a) focusing on the directors' obligation to seek the best value reasonably available to the stockholders; and
(b) requiring a close scrutiny of board action which could be contrary to
the stockholders' interests.
Id. at 47-48.
143. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Corp., 559 A.2d 1261, 1268 (Del.
1988) (explaining how certain defense measures trigger Revlon duties). The court
in Mills held that lock-ups trigger Revlon duties when the lock-ups served as a detriment to the shareholders by ending an active auction and foreclosing further bidding. See id. Additionally, the court held that no-shop clauses trigger Revlon duties
when they fail to provide a "material advantage" to the stockholders. See id.
144. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(Del. 1989) (explaining that Revlon court's decision to impose duty to maximize
shareholder value was triggered because board responded to hostile takeover by
"contemplating a 'bust-up' sale of assets in a leveraged acquisition" (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986))).
145. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1151 ("The adoption of structural safety devices
alone does not trigger Revlon."). In Time, the court found that Time's stated belief
of a long-term strategic alliance with its suitor, Warner Communications, was evi-
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When Revlon responsibilities attach, the burden is on the board
to prove its actions were reasonable. 146 If the board proves that its
actions were reasonable, the board then receives the protection of
the presumptions of the business judgment rule. 14 7 If, however, the
board cannot satisfy its Revlon duties, the court will review the transaction under the entire fairness standard. 1 48 When the decision of
the board is tainted by self-interest, this duty of loyalty breach will
rebut the presumption of propriety under the business judgment
rule and the court will review the transaction under the entire fairness standard. 149 In addition to situations in which the board unilaterally adopts defensive measures or decides to sell the company,
courts will also apply a different type of enhanced judicial scrutiny
to cases in which board actions significantly interfere with shareholder voting rights.
V.

MANIPULATING THE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE-BLASiaU
COMPELLING JUSTIFICATION STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts apply a different enhanced scrutiny standard of review
to board action that directly manipulates shareholder voting rights
dence that Time's board of directors did not intend to sell control of the company.
See id. at 1154 ("Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
corporate plan for a short term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis
to sustain the corporate strategy."). The court held that Time's adoption of defensive measures to protect its stock-for-stock merger with Warner did not trigger the
Revlon duty. See id. at 1151 ("The adoption of structural safety devices alone does
not trigger Revlon."). In addition, the court concluded that Time's recasting of its
merger agreement with Warner, from a share exchange to a share purchase after
an unwarranted tender offer was made by Paramount, did not provide sufficient
reason to conclude that Time had either abandoned its long-term strategic plan or
made a sale of Time inevitable. See id. ("[W]e do not find in Time's recasting of its
merger agreement with Warner from a share exchange to a share purchase a basis
to conclude that Time had either abandoned its strategic plan or made a sale of
Time inevitable."). Even though Warner would end up with 62% of Time's stock
as a result of the new agreement, the court held that a sale of control was not made
because the merger merely represented a strategic plan for Time's expansion in
which Time's board of directors would retain control. See id. at 1146 (explaining
ownership percentages following proposed merger).
146. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180 (noting that when potential for conflict exists,
burden rests on directors to prove reasonableness).
147. See Paramount,637 A.2d at 45 ("When Revlon duties devolve upon directors, this Court will continue to exact an enhanced judicial scrutiny at the threshold, as in Unoca, before the normal presumptions of the business judgment rule
will apply.").
148. See Mills, 559 A.2d at 1287 (stating that when Revlon test is met, Unocal
standards will apply); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1377 (Del. 1995) (holding that when Unoca's reasonableness standard is met,
court will review transaction under entire fairness standard).
149. See Palm & Kearney, supra note 1, at 1309-12 (defining effect of breach of
loyalty on application of business judgment rule).
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in order to thwart those rights. 150 Heightened scrutiny is appropriate in these situations because the board's tactics effectively deny
the shareholders' basic right to exert control over the board's management, thereby altering the fundamental allocation of power between the shareholders and the board of directors.15 1 Once the
challenging shareholder shows that the board has manipulated
shareholder voting rights in order to thwart those rights, the burden shifts to the directors to show that the board had a compelling
justification for infringing upon the effective exercise of the shareholder franchise. 152 If the board meets this burden, the board gets
the benefit of the business judgment rule and the burden shifts
back to the challenging shareholder to rebut the rule's presump153
tions of propriety.
A. Blasius' CompellingJustification Standard of Review
The genesis for the "compelling justification" requirement can
be found in two early Delaware court decisions, Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer C0.154 and Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.15 5 In
150. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(holding that enhanced scrutiny is applied to board actions that impede shareholder voting rights); see also Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 495-96 (Del.
Ch.) (recognizing application of enhanced scrutiny test when directors impede
shareholder franchise), affd, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995).
151. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 (emphasizing importance of maintaining
shareholder franchise). The court stated:
The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which
the legitimacy of directorial power rests. Generally, shareholders have
only two protections against perceived inadequate business performance.
They may sell their stock (which, if done in sufficient numbers, may so
affect security prices as to create an incentive for altered managerial performance), or they may vote to replace incumbent board members....
[W] hether the vote is seen functionally as an unimportant formalism, or
as an important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the theory
that legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and officers)
over vast aggregations of property that they do not own. Thus, when
viewed from a broad, institutional perspective, it can be seen that matters
involving the integrity of the shareholder voting process involve consideration not present in any other context in which directors exercise delegated power.
Id.
152. See id. at 661 (stating that when board acts for primary purpose of impeding stockholders' voting exercise, actions will be upheld only when board meets
"the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for such action").
153. See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del.
1995) (noting that once boards meet enhanced scrutiny burden, whether it be
Unocal or Blasius, presumptions of business judgment rule attach).
154. 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
155. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). In Schnell the Delaware Supreme Court enjoined management from advancing an annual shareholders' meeting that was set
according to the bylaws to an earlier date in order to impede a successful proxy
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Condec, the Chancery Court adopted a per se rule that a good faith
dispute over corporate policy could never justify board action enacted primarily to reduce the voting power of a controlling shareholder.'

56

Although Condec's per se rule was eventually abandoned

by the Delaware courts as being overly broad, the holding high1 57
lighted the court's assiduous protection of corporate democracy.
The court in Schnell introduced the principle that courts would not
condone technically "legal" acts when used to achieve inequitable
58
ends.
fight by shareholders. Id. at 439-40 (holding that advancement of bylaw date of
stockholders' meeting by board, in attempt to obstruct legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders in exercise of their rights to undertake proxy contest against
management, is contrary to established principles of corporate democracy and,
thus, was impermissible). The court concluded that the primary purpose of the
board action was "inequitable," and therefore, not permissible because it was an
attempt to utilize the "corporate machinery and the Delaware Law for the purpose
of perpetuating itself in office." See id. at 439 ("[The board of directors] attempted
to utilize the corporate machinery and the Delaware Law for the purpose of perpetuating itself in office ....
These are inequitable purposes, contrary to established principles of corporate democracy."). The fact that management acted
legally and complied strictly with the provisions of Delaware corporate law does
not allow an inequitable action to become permissible. See id.
156. Condec, 230 A.2d at 775-77 (holding that board's issuance of additional
authorized but unissued shares to selectively dilute majority shareholder into minority shareholder was per se invalid). The court stated that
[such board action] was clearly unwarranted because it unjustifiably
strikes at the very heart of corporate representation by causing a stockholder with an equitable right to a majority of corporate stock to have his
right to a proportionate voice and influence in corporate affairs to be
diminished by the simple act of an exchange of stock which brought no
money into the Lunkenheimer treasury, was not connected with a stock
option plan or other proper corporate purpose, and which was obviously
designed for the primary purpose of reducing Condec's stockholdings in
Lunkenheimer below a majority.
Id. at 777.
157. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661 (stating that per se rule that would strike
down any board action taken for primary purpose of interfering with effectiveness
of corporate vote has advantage of "vigorously enforcing" concept of corporate
democracy, but also has disadvantage that it may sweep too broadly); see also Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., No. CIV.A.9173, 1987 WL 16285, at *8 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 27, 1987) (refusing to apply per se rule of Condec and leaving open whether
Delaware law created "unyielding prohibition to the issuance of stock for the primary purpose of depriving a controlling shareholder of control or whether, as Unocal suggests . . ., such an extraordinary step might be justified in some
circumstances"). The court in Phillips held that "no justification has been shown
that would arguably make the extraordinary step of issuance of stock for the admitted purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder rights reasonable in light of
the corporate benefit, if any, sought to be obtained." Id.
158. See, e.g., Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 907 (Del. Ch.
1980) (enjoining board of directors from taking action that was legal, but that was
intended to prevent shareholder proxy contest). The court noted that "[i]n
Schnell, as it is by now well known to those involved with Delaware corporation law,
it was held that inequitable action by management in amending corporate bylaws
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Following Condec and Schnell, Delaware courts began to apply
heightened scrutiny to directors' actions that impeded shareholder
voting rights. 159 Even after Unocal's enhanced scrutiny became the
standard of review for defensive actions taken by directors to prevent takeover attempts, courts continued to distinguish between defensive actions and those actions involving the direct manipulation
of shareholder voting rights. 160 Delaware courts applied an even
stricter scrutiny in the latter cases, many of which involved situa-

161
tions in which the board was losing a voting battle.
The Chancery Court of Delaware first enunciated the "compel162
ling justification" standard in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.
In that case, Blasius was a new stockholder of Atlas who had accumulated over nine percent of Atlas' common stock within four
months; Blasius then subsequently recommended that Atlas restructure the company, amend its bylaws to increase the size of its board
and fill the new directorships with Blasius' nominees. 163 The board
1 64
viewed Blasius' action as an attempt to takeover the company.
The board then amended the corporation's bylaws to change the
date of the shareholders' meeting, increased the size of its board

so as to change the date of the annual meeting did not become permissible simply
because it was legally possible." Id. at 907, 914 (enjoining board from changing its
bylaws and scheduling annual meeting, after receiving notice of shareholders' intent to commence a proxy contest, so that shareholders could not comply with
notice provisions concerning director nominations); see also Giuricich v. Emtrol
Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) ("The courts of this state will not allow the
wrongful subversion of corporate democracy by manipulation of the corporate machinery or by machinations under the cloak of Delaware law." (citing Schnell, 285
A.2d 437)). The court found that the election of successor directors had been
effectively frustrated by a willful perpetuation of a deadlock for the admitted "primary purpose" of giving the incumbents "the governing hand in forthcoming executive compensation contract negotiations." Id. (applying "careful judicial
scrutiny," and recommending appointment of custodian for corporation). The act
may have been legal, but the court rendered it invalid. See id. ("This is an unworthy purpose, creating a situation violative of corporate democracy.").
159. See Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Del. Ch. 1987).
160. See id. (rejecting argument that decision to delay annual meeting was in
stockholder interest and should be given deference and holding that evidence existed that decision manipulated election machinery and that, therefore, board had
burden ofjustification). The court explained that "[w] hen the election machinery
appears, at least facially, to have been manipulated, those in charge of the election
have the burden of persuasion to justify their actions." Id.
161. See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439 (holding that management's attempt to utilize Delaware law for purposes of perpetrating itself in office and obstructing legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders to exercise their rights to undertake proxy
contest against management is impermissible). The fact that management's inequitable action is legally possible is not sufficient to render it permissible. See id.
162. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
163. See id. at 653-54.
164. See id.
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from seven to nine and filled the two new positions with nominees
165
friendly to the incumbent board.
In reviewing these board actions, the court recognized that the
directors acted to protect the company and its stockholders from
what they, in good faith, believed was an unwise and potentially
harmful consent solicitation proposed by a shareholder. 166 The
court also found that the incumbent board acted within its legal
167
authority in increasing the board's size from seven to nine.
Nonetheless, because the board's primary purpose in acting was to
thwart a hostile shareholder's majority vote, the court found that
the board had committed an unintended breach of the duty of loyalty to the corporation's shareholders.1 68 The court ruled that because the board's actions inevitably involved a conflict of interest,
the court should not apply the deferential business judgment rule,
but should instead review the board's actions under a stricter standard-the compelling justification standard. 169 Under this standard, the court rejected the board's justification that "the board
knows better than do the shareholders what was in the corporation's best interest." 7 0° Probably because of the difficulty of meet165. See id. (discussing board's emergency decision to expand number of directors by amending bylaws). Although there was a scheduled meeting within a
week, the board called an emergency meeting in order to add additional directors.
See id. Evidence suggested, and the court concluded, that the board was motivated
to preclude the holders of a majority of the company's shares from placing a majority of new directors on the board through Blasius' consent solicitation. See id. at
656 (concluding that board immediately endorsed persons for board in order to
preclude majority of shareholders from electing new board members selected by
Blasius).
166. See id. at 663 (noting that board entitled to take steps to evade perceived
risk).
167. See id. ("[T]he addition of these qualified men would, under other circumstances, be clearly appropriate as an independent step."). The court noted
that if the board was not motivated to thwart a shareholder majority, "but rather
had taken action completely independently of the consent solicitation.... it is very
unlikely that such action would be subject to judicial nullification." Id. at 655 (citing Frantz Mfg. Co.v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1080 (Del. Ch.), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)).
168. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 655 (concluding that even though "the action
taken was taken in good faith, it constituted an unintended violation of the duty of
loyalty that the board owed to the shareholders").
169. See id. at 660-61 (noting that when action interferes with effectiveness of
shareholder vote, there inevitably exists conflict between board and shareholder
majority and "the board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling
justification for such action").
170. Id. ("The theory of our corporation law confers power upon directors as
the agents of the shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters."). The court,
however, elaborated on its reluctance to adopt a per se rule:
In my view, our inability to foresee now all of the future settings in which
a board might, in good faith, paternalistically seek to thwart a share-
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ing the "compelling justification" standard and the few situations in
which the board acts in order to impede the shareholder franchise,
Delaware courts have sparingly applied the Blasius analysis.1 71
In Blasius, the court noted that Unocal's standard of review did
not apply to an action "designed for the primary purpose of interfering with the effectiveness of a stockholder vote."1 7 2 The court in
Blasius held that such action required closer scrutiny than that provided by Unocal because of the importance of the shareholder
franchise to the scheme of corporate governance. 173 In later cases,
however, issues arose over what standards applied in situations arguably involving the manipulation of shareholder voting rights, but
also involving defensive responses that precluded, coerced or significantly affected shareholder choices.1 74 The issue became whether
Unocal, Blasius or some combination of the two provided the applicable rules in such cases. This distinction between Blasius and Unocal was recognized by the Delaware Supreme Court in the Unitrin
decision, when the court clarified a number of issues under Unocal,
175
including the relationship between Blasius and Unocal.
holder vote, counsels against the adoption of a per se rule invalidating, in
equity, every board action taken for the sole or primary purpose of
thwarting a shareholder vote, even though I recognize the transcending
significance of the franchise to the claims to legitimacy of our scheme of
corporate governance. It may be that some set of facts would justify such
extreme action.
Id.
171. See Dolgoff v. Projectavision, Inc., No. CIV.A.14805, 1996 WL 91945, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 1996) (holding that "equitable power" of Blasius "obviously
must be invoked sparingly and only when circumstances make relatively clear that
inequitable behavior or manipulation is present" (citing Alabama By-Prods. Corp.
v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991); Staar Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588
A.2d 1130, 1137 n.2 (Del. 1991))).
172. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 ("Our authorities, as well as sound principles,
suggest that the central importance of the franchise to the scheme of corporate
governance, requires that, in this setting, [Unoca's enhanced scrutiny] not be applied and that closer scrutiny be accorded to such transaction.").
173. See id. at 662.
174. See Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 495 (Del. Ch.) (recognizing
that certain claims raise "the question of what form of analysis-Blasius, Unoca4 or
an amalgam of both-is to be employed"), aff'd, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995); see also
Gregory W. Werkheiser, Comment, Defending the Corporate Bastion: Proportionality
and the Treatment of DraconianDefenses from Unocal to Unitrin, 21 DEL. J. CoRP. L.
103, 124-26 (1996) (examining "the continued viability of Blasius as a separate doctrine in the post-Unitrin landscape").
175. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373-74 (Del.
1995) (stating that enhanced judicial scrutiny mandated by Unocal is not structured, mechanical exercise, but rather "a flexible paradigm thatjurists can apply to
the myriad of 'fact scenarios' that confront corporate boards" (citing Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990))).
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Distinctions Between the Blasius and Unocal/Unitrin Standards of
Review
Determining whether the Unocal/ Unitrin "enhanced scrutiny"

or the Blasius "compelling justification" standard of review should
be applied is sometimes difficult. 176 To determine whether Blasius
alone or Unocal applies to a particular board action, it is necessary
to distinguish board actions that intentionally interfere with shareholder voting rights "in circumstances unrelated to a tender offer
or other contested acquisition ...

and.., in circumstances where

an acquiror launches both a tender offer and a proxy fight to remove the board to facilitate the offer." 177 In the former situation,
the courts will apply the Blasius "compelling justification" standard
in free-standing form. 178 In the latter context, the board action will
179
trigger a hybrid analysis incorporating both Unocal and Blasius.
Under this hybrid analysis, the courts will evaluate the board's
decision to enact a defensive measure under Unocal and the board
will have to establish a compelling justification to meet the proportionality prong of the Unocal standard.' 80 Delaware courts have
generally applied this hybrid analysis in two types of situations, both
involving the manipulation of shareholder voting rights in the context of a defensive mechanism. First, the courts perform the hybrid
analysis when a board action has the effect of "precluding effective
176. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992) (noting that Blasius
and Unocal tests are "not mutually exclusive").
177. Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 495 (explaining how role of Blasius is affected by circumstances surrounding board action).
178. See id. at 496 (stating that Blasius analysis would apply in circumstances
unrelated to tender offer or other contested acquisition).
179. See id. at 495 ("[T] he board action will 'necessarily invoke both Unocal
and Blasius because both tests 'recognize the inherent conflicts of interest that
arise when shareholders are not permitted free exercise of their franchise.'" (quoting Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3)).
180. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375 (stating that both parts of Unocal inquiry
must be satisfied before business judgment rule attaches to defensive actions of
board of directors). The second aspect or the proportionality test of the Unocal
burden requires that the board demonstrate the proportionality of its response to
the threat posed by the offer. See id. at 1376 (examining Unitrin's poison-pill defense to protect stockholders from "low ball" bid). The Unitrincourt accepted "the
basic legal tenets" set forth in Blasius and stated that "the board bears the heavy
burden of demonstrating a compellingjustification for such action." Id. at 1378-79
(quoting Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988)); see
Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 495 ("[A] board's unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure 'touching upon issues of control' that 'purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders' will be evaluated under Unocal. However, even within that framework that
board decision will be viewed as 'strongly suspect . . .and cannot be sustained
without a "compelling justification."'" (quoting Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3)).
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shareholder action." 8 1 Second, board action triggers the hybrid
test when the action has the effect of "snatching victory from an
insurgent slate on the eve of the noticed meeting." 182
If, in response to a contested takeover attempt, a board acts
defensively by manipulating shareholder voting rights, then courts
will apply the Blasius test in the proportionality prong of the Unocall Unitrin test.183 If the board frustrates the shareholder franchise
when there is no actual or perceived threat to corporate control,
181. See Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 495 (acknowledging application of hybrid analysis
where board action interfered with voting rights and acquiror launched both
tender offer and proxy fight to remove board to facilitate offer). The court stated
that "the board action will 'necessarily [invoke] both Unocal and Blasius because
both tests 'recognize the inherent conflicts of interest that arise when shareholders
are not permitted free exercise of their franchise.'" Id. (quoting Stroud, 606 A.2d
at 92 n.3); see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)
(finding that attempt of management to move stockholders' meeting forward in
order to impede successful proxy fight by shareholders, gave shareholders little
chance to wage successful proxy fight).
182. See Aprahamian v. HBO & Co, 531 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (Del. Ch. 1987)
("The corporate election process, if it is to have any validity, must be conducted
with scrupulous fairness and without any advantage being conferred or denied to
any candidate or slate of candidates."). In Aprahamian, the board moved the date
of a stockholder meeting back to the conclusion of a proxy contest after learning
that a dissenting shareholder group held proxies representing a majority of the
outstanding shares. See id. The court stated:
In the interests of what is left of corporate democracy, those in charge of
the election machinery of a corporation must be held to the highest standards in providing for and conducting corporate elections. The business
judgment rule therefore does not confer any presumption of propriety
on the acts of the directors in postponing the annual meeting. Quite to
the contrary. When the election machinery appears, at least facially, to
have been manipulated, those in charge of the election have the burden
of persuasion to justify their actions.
Id.
183. See Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 495 (holding that board action will "necessarily
[invoke] both the Unocaland Blasius [tests]" if action interferes with voting rights
and acquiror launches both tender offer and proxy fight to remove board) (citing
Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3). The court stated that both the Unocal and Blasius tests
"recognize the inherent conflicts of interest that arise when shareholders are not
permitted free exercise of their franchise." Id.; see also Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v.
Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286 (Del. Ch. 1989) (holding that Blasius should not
be construed as new standard separate from Unocal, instead Blasius is "a specific
expression of the proportionality test as applied to conduct that effectively precluded the election of directors"). In Polaroid,the target issued stock to a friendly
investor engaged in a self-tender and bought back its own stock coincidental with a
hostile tender offer. See id. at 280-85. The Chancery Court found that the target's
action did not have the primary purpose of interfering with the election. See id. at
286 (finding that challenging shareholders would have had approximately same
percentage of likely votes as target). The court then applied the enhanced scrutiny standard announced in Unocal and found that suitor's offer, albeit noncoercive and possibly inadequate, justified some level of defensive response and that
the issuance of preferred stock to friendly investors, as well as the stock repurchases, were not disproportionate to the threat. See id. at 287-90 (noting that in
most situations, noncoercive, inadequate tender offer does not constitute threat).
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however, then Blasiusalone will apply.1 84 If a board acts defensively
to counter a hostile tender offer in a manner that does not impede
shareholder voting rights, then only the Unocal standard of review
18 5
applies.
Finally, mindful that the purpose of the enhanced scrutiny
standard of review is to ensure that directors are not manipulating
the corporate machinery to thwart the shareholder franchise, the
Delaware Supreme Court has made it clear that even if the directors' actions have the effect of impeding the shareholder franchise,
the directors may rely upon a fully informed majority of shareholders as proper justification for their actions. 186 In such cases, the
shareholders themselves vote to limit their franchise rights; the limitation is not imposed on them by unilateral board action. Thus,
the result of a vote by a fully informed majority of shareholders,
although giving greater authority to the board or ceding authority
from the shareholders, does not implicate either the Unocal or Blasius analysis.' 8 7 As discussed in the next Section, shareholder approval can also affect a shareholder challenge of a board's decision
in other contexts.

184. See Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 495-96 (stating that Blasius analysis would normally
be applied by itself when board action interferes with shareholder voting rights in
circumstances unrelated to tender offer or other contested acquisition).
185. See id. at 496 (explaining that board action "only delayed, but did not
preclude, a shareholder vote"). For example, in Kidsco, the court concluded that
only the Unocall Unitrin analysis was appropriate in evaluating a board action that
amended the bylaws to give the directors an additional 25 days to call a shareholder meeting in response to a proxy solicitation challenging the target director's
incumbency. See id. (holding that Unocal/Unitrin standard applies when bylaw
amendment only delayed, rather than precluded, shareholder vote). The court
concluded that because the purpose of the bylaw amendment was merely to give
the board time to "explore and develop other options" and because the effect of
the amendment did not "preclude a shareholder vote on the director's continued
incumbency" but merely delayed it by 25 days, the board action did not frustrate
the shareholder franchise, and therefore, the heightened scrutiny of Blasius was
not appropriate. See id.
186. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 95 (holding that fully informed shareholder vote
removes need to inquire whether board acted for improper purpose when changing bylaws). The shareholders in Stroud, unlike the shareholders in Blasius and
Aprahamian,had a full and fair opportunity to vote on the bylaw amendments and
did so. Id. at 83 (recognizing that shareholders had option to accept or reject
amendment).
187. See id. ("In the absence of fraud, a fully informed shareholder vote in
favor of even a 'voidable' transaction ratifies board action and places the burden of
proof on the challenger.").
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RATIFICATION-SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF, CHANGING
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND/OR EXTINGUISHING
CLAIMS

The approval or ratification of a transaction by the shareholders or a majority of disinterested directors of a corporation can have
a significant effect on a challenge to a business decision made by a
board.' 88 Under certain circumstances, such approval or authoriza-

tion can change the standard of review, shift the burden of proof or
even extinguish a breach of fiduciary duty claim.18 9 This Section
discusses the effect of shareholder and disinterested director approval or ratification on a board decision.
A number of distinct situations permit or require a board to
ask for shareholder approval of a business decision.1 90 First, the
Delaware statutes require shareholder approval of most fundamental corporate changes, including certificate amendments, mergers
188. See In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc. Shareholders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194,
1202-03 (Del. Ch. 1995) [hereinafter WheelabratorII] (explaining that ratification
of parent-subsidiary merger or cash-out merger results in complex judicial examination into applicable standard of review and placement of burden of proof). Typically, the determination as to the applicable standard of review and the placement
of burden of proof rests on the type of interested transaction at issue and the roles
of the participants in the transaction. See id. at 1203 ("[T]he operative effect of
shareholder ratification in duty of loyalty cases has been either to change the standard of review to the business judgment rule, with the burden of proof resting
upon the plaintiff, or to leave 'entire fairness' as the review standard, but shift the
burden of proof to the plaintiff.").
189. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 334 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing
effect of ratification on transaction). The Chancery Court in Vogelstein stated:
Four possible effects of shareholder ratification appear logically available:
First, one might conclude that an effective shareholder ratification acts as
a complete defense to any charge of breach of duty. Second, one might
conclude that the effect of such ratification is to shift the substantive test
on judicial review of the act from one of fairness that would otherwise be
obtained (because the transaction is an interested one) to one of waste.
Third, one might conclude that the ratification shifts the burden of proof
of unfairness to plaintiff, but leaves the shareholder-protective test in
place. Fourth, one might conclude (perhaps because of great respect for
the collective action disabilities that attend shareholder action in public
corporations) that shareholder ratification offers no assurance of assent
of a character that deserves judicial recognition.
Id. Additionally, the court stated that "[i] n all events, informed, uncoerced, disinterested shareholder ratification of a transaction in which corporate directors have
a material conflict of interest has the effect of protecting the transaction from
judicial review except on the basis of waste." Id. at 336.
190. For an in-depth discussion of situations in which statutes require the
board to obtain shareholder approval of a transaction, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 242(b), 251 (c), 275 (1974 & Supp. 1990), infra notes 202-29 and accompanying
text.
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and dissolution. 19 1 Second, section 144 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law provides the options of obtaining disinterested director or shareholder approval in an interested director transaction. 192 Third, shareholders can ratify a board action even though
the board had no actual authority to take the action initially. 193 Finally, the board can seek shareholder approval in an effort to proa94
tect the board's decision from breach of fiduciary duty claims.
As discussed previously in Part I and Part II of this Article, the
standard of review and burden of proof that courts use to scrutinize
a challenged transaction hinges on the type of action taken and the
status of the parties to the transaction. 195 On the basis of these fac191. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (requiring shareholder approval of
certificate amendment); id. § 251(c) (requiring shareholder approval of merger);
id. § 275 (requiring vote by majority of outstanding stock entitled to vote before
dissolution certificate is valid).
192. See id. § 144(a) (2)-(3) (voiding some contracts between corporation and
its directors, unless shareholders were informed of transaction and approved of
transaction as "fair as to the corporation").
193. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 220 (Del. 1979) (holding that
when stockholders ratify unauthorized acts of board, ratification of stockholders is
binding).
194. See, e.g., Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Del. Ch. 1995) (holding
that informed shareholder vote approving authorized board action extinguished
claims that board breached fiduciary duties).
195. See id. at 1203 (discussing two categories of transactions and their effect
on standard of review and burden of proof). The court stated that when concerned with
"interested" transaction cases between a corporation and its directors (or
between the corporation and an entity in which the corporation's directors are also directors or have a financial interest) ... [a]pproval by fully
informed, disinterested shareholders pursuant to § 144(a) (2) invokes
"the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or
waste with the burden of proof upon the party attacking the transaction."
Id. (quoting Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987)). The court
further explained that when independent shareholder ratification of interested
director actions occurs, the burden shifts to the challenging party to prove that
.no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the consideration
received for the options was a fair exchange for the options granted." Id.
Furthermore, ratification may affect action when a transaction is between the
corporation and its controlling stockholder. See id. (noting that ordinary standard
of review for parent-subsidiary merger is entire fairness). "But where the merger is
conditioned upon approval by a 'majority of the minority' stockholder vote, and
such approval is granted, the standard of review remains entire fairness, but the
burden of demonstrating that the merger was unfair shifts to the plaintiff." Id.
(citations omitted); see also Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del.
1985) (stating that defendant bore initial burden of proving fairness because it was
majority shareholder and that business judgment standard applied because merger
was conducted at arm's length); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del.
1983) (holding that directors who are on "both sides of a transaction" are required
to prove good faith and fairness of bargain); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93
A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952) (holding that directors who "stand on both sides of
transaction" bear burden of establishing entire fairness); Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de
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tors, a court first determines whether the business judgment rule,
enhanced scrutiny or the entire fairness standard of review applies.1 9 6 As noted previously, the business judgment rule is the
proper standard of review unless the challenging party pleads facts
sufficient to rebut the rule's presumption that the directors have
acted in accord with their fiduciary duties. 197 If the challenging
party rebuts the business judgment rule's presumption by proving a
breach of the duty of care, loyalty or good faith, then the board will
have the burden to establish the entire fairness of its decision. 198
In many cases, a challenged transaction has received approval
by disinterested shareholders or a committee of disinterested directors. The issue then becomes, what effect, if any, the approval or
ratification has on the challenged transaction. 9 9 For example,
even if the challenging party has rebutted the presumption of proNemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500-01 (Del. Ch. 1990) (discussing contexts in
which courts invoke entire fairness).
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that when "neither shareholder ratification nor disinterested director approval could be obtained (due to a deadlock)
the 'intrinsic fairness' review standard would govern." Id. at 500 (citing Marciano,
535 A.2d at 405). The Citron court also noted that "shareholder ratification of
challenged stock options issued to directors shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff and causes the transaction to be reviewed under the business judgment standard." Id. (citing Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91
A.2d 57, 59 (Del. 1952); Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 91 A.2d 786, 793 (Del. Ch. 1952)).
196. See Palm & Kearney, supra note 1, at 1316-20 (detailing shifting burdens,
business judgment rule and entire fairness standards).
197. See Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) ("[In managing the business
and affairs of a corporation], directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary
duty to protect the interests of the corporation and to act in the best interest of its
shareholders."). The court in Cede II concluded that the business judgment rule
"posits a powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the directors in that a
decision made by a loyal and informed board will not be overturned by the courts
unless it cannot be 'attributed to any rational business purpose. '" Id. at 361 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)); see also Palm &
Kearney, supra note 1, at 1300-20 (discussing business judgment rule and duties of
care, loyalty and good faith).
198. See Cede III, 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (holding that when plaintiffs rebut business judgment rule presumption, directors must prove entire fairness); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 n.7 (Del. 1995)
(noting entire fairness applies when business judgment rule presumption is rebutted); Cede II, 634 A.2d at 361 (same); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del.
1993) (holding that when plaintiffs rebut business judgment rule presumption,
directors' actions are reviewed under entire fairness standard); Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988) (stating that interested
directors must show entire fairness of transaction).
199. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937 (discussing effect of "approval of a
merger... by an informal vote of the minority shareholders"); Weinberger, 457 A.2d
at 703 (addressing burden of proof upon parties when merger has been "approyed" by vote of majority of minority shareholders); WheelabratorII, 663 A.2d at
1198 (noting defendant's argument that "fully informed shareholder vote approving the merger" extinguished plaintiffs' claims).
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priety under the business judgment rule so that the entire fairness
standard applies, the court may decide that ratification by a majority of the disinterested directors or stockholders shifts the burden
of proof to the challenger to show that the transaction was unfair to
the corporation, rather than leaving the burden on the board to
200
prove the transaction's entire fairness.
Two types of transactions form the basic paradigms for the effect of ratification on a board's decision: (1) mergers between the
corporation and its controlling shareholder and (2) interested director transactions.2 0 1 This Section will first discuss the effect of
ratification for these two paradigms and then discuss the effect of
ratification in other types of transactions.
A.

Self-Interested Transactions Between the Corporation and Its
ControllingShareholder

Traditionally, a controlling or dominating stockholder that
stands on both sides of a transaction with the corporation it controls bears the burden of proving the transaction's entire fairness. 20 2 Sometimes the controlling shareholder will condition the
consummation of the transaction on the approval of a majority of
the minority stockholders or disinterested board members. 203 An
200. See Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937 (stating that ratification of parent-subsidiary merger involving controlling stockholder by majority of minority stockholders
invokes entire fairness standard of review with burden of proof shifting to plaintiff
to show merger's unfairness to corporation).
201. See, e.g., WheelabratorI, 663 A.2d at 1203 ("The ratification decisions that
involve duty of loyalty claims are of two kinds: (a) 'interested' transactions cases
between a corporation and its directors.., and (b) cases involving a transaction
between the corporation and its controlling shareholder.").
202. See Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937. The court stated that "approval of a
merger... by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, while
not a legal prerequisite, shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the merger
entirely to the plaintiffs." Id. Nevertheless, the majority shareholder retains "the
burden of showing complete disclosure of all material facts relevant to that vote."
Id.; see also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del.
1994) ("Thereafter, this Court recognized that it would be inconsistent with its
holding in Weinberger to apply the business judgment rule in the context of an
interested merger transaction, which, by its very nature, did not require a business
purpose."); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 ("[T] he ultimate burden of proof is on the
majority shareholder to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transaction is fair."). Additionally, when ratification by a majority of the minority stockholders is required, either by statute or by corporate charter, the controlling
stockholder bears the burden of showing that it "completely disclosed" all material
facts relevant to the transaction. See id. (holding that, in this case, vote was not
informed one).
203. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116-17 (involving stockholder ratification of cashout merger between corporation and its de facto controlling stockholder). The
court, however, noted:
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example of a self-interested controlling shareholder transaction is
the merger of a subsidiary with its parent corporation.
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,20 4 the court discussed many of the
rules governing a parent-subsidiary cash-out merger, including the
effect of ratification in such mergers. 20 5 The court in Weinberger
held that, to invoke the entire fairness standard, the party challenging the merger has the initial burden of showing some basis to invoke the entire fairness standard. 20 6 After making that showing, the
burden shifts to the parent corporation to establish the entire fairness of the cash-out merger transaction. 20 7 The court observed that
approval of the transaction by an informed majority of the minority
stockholders shifts the burden to the party challenging the transaction to establish that the transaction was unfair to the corporaThe controlling stockholder relationship has the potential to influence,
however subtly, the vote of [ratifying] minority stockholders in a manner
that is not likely to occur in a transaction with a noncontrolling party. ...
Consequently, in a merger between the corporation and its controlling
stockholder-even one negotiated by disinterested, independent directors-no court could be certain whether the transaction terms fully approximate what truly independent parties would have achieved in an
arm's length negotiation.
Id. at 1116; see Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del.
Ch. 1990) (involving stockholder ratification of cash-out merger between corporation and its de jure controlling stockholder); see also Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 841-42 (Del. 1987) (involving stockholder ratification of cashout merger between corporation and its controlling stockholder); Rosenblatt, 493
A.2d at 937-38 (same); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (same).
204. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
205. Id. at 710 ("There is no 'safe harbor' for such divided loyalties in Delaware. When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction,
they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous
inherent fairness of the bargain.").
206. Id. at 703 ("[E]ven though the ultimate burden of proof is on the majority shareholder to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transaction is
fair, it is first the burden of the plaintiff attacking the merger to demonstrate some
basis for invoking the fairness obligation.").
207. See id. at 710 ("The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand
that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness."). After allocating the ultimate burden of proving entire
fairness, the court observed:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it
was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how
the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The
latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger .... However, the test for fairness is not a
bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue
must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.
Id. at 711 (citations omitted).
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tion.2 0 8 Thus, shareholder ratification in this situation only has the
effect of shifting the burden of proof. The standard of reviewentire fairness-remains the same. The controlling shareholder relying on the ratification to shift the standard of review has the burden of showing that the controlling shareholder disclosed all the
material facts to the disinterested shareholders or an independent
directors committee ratifying the transaction and those directors or
shareholders were fully informed of all material facts relating to
209
that transaction.
In a later case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the same

rules apply to a parent-subsidiary merger with a de facto controlling
shareholder.2 1 0 Like Weinberger, the court held that when an independent committee of directors approves a merger between the

company and its de facto controlling shareholder, the burden may
shift to the challenging party to establish that the transaction was
unfair. 211 For the burden to shift when an independent committee
208. See id. at 703 (rejecting then-existing requirement that parent must show
business purpose to justify parent-subsidiary merger). In Weinberger, the court attempted to emphasize that disinterested stockholder ratification, while important
in shifting the burden of proof, had no effect on the standard of review. Id. at 715
(stating that it did not believe that any additional meaningful protection is afforded minority shareholders by business purpose requirement and, thus, "such
requirement shall no longer be of any force or effect"). Essentially, no business
purpose is required to justify a transaction in which a controlling stockholder acts
to merge out the minority, and therefore, the business judgment rule cannot be
the applicable standard of review in such situations. See id. ("[W] here corporate
action has been approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders.., the burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show that the transaction
was unfair to the minority." (citing Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del.
1979))).
209. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 88 (Del. 1995)
("A controlling shareholder owes a duty of complete candor when standing on
both sides of a transaction and must disclose fully all the material facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction" (citing Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Del. 1994))).
210. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del.
1994) (determining that Weinberger entire fairness standard applied to situations in
which stockholder maintained de facto control over subsidiary). In Kahn, Alcatel
USA Corporation attempted to acquire Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. in a
cash-out merger. Id. at 1114. The controlling shareholder claimed that the business judgment rule should apply because the transaction had been approved by an
independent committee of the board. See id. In order for the Kahn court to determine whether Alcatel, who held 43.3% of Lynch stock, was a de facto controlling
shareholder, the court stated that "'a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it
owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation."' Id. at 1113-14 (quoting Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)).
211. See id. at 1114. The court noted that if the controlling shareholder secured an effective approval or ratification, then the burden of proof would shift to
the challenging party. See id. at 1117 ("[A] pproval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority, sharehold-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

49

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 1

1092

VILLANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 1043

approves the merger, however, "the majority stockholder must not
dictate the terms of the merger" and the independent committee
must possess "real bargaining power that it can exercise with the
majority shareholder on an arms length basis."2 1 2 In short, the iners shifts the burden."). Although the board formed a special committee who
determined that the merger was fair, the court held that, under these circumstances, the burden of establishing the transaction's unfairness to the subsidiary
would not shift to the challenging party. See id. at 1120-21 (finding that independent committee's ability to negotiate at arm's length was compromised by controlling shareholder's threat of hostile takeover). According to the court:
A condition precedent to finding that the burden of proving entire fairness has shifted in an interested merger transaction is a careful judicial
analysis of the factual circumstances of each case. Particular consideration must be given to evidence of whether the special committee was truly
independent, fully informed, and had the freedom to negotiate at arm's
length. "Although perfection is not possible," unless the controlling or
dominating shareholder can demonstrate that it has not only formed an
independent committee but also replicated a process "as though each of
the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power at arm's
length," the burden of proving entire fairness will not shift.
Id. (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709-10 n.7).
212. Id. at 1116 ("[T]he unchanging nature of the underlying 'interested'
transaction requires careful scrutiny." (citing Weinberger,457 A.2d at 710)). Relying on the decision in Citron, the Kahn court stated that
in a merger between the corporation and its controlling stockholder...
no court could be certain whether the transaction terms fully approximate what truly independent parties would have achieved in an arm's
length negotiation. Given that uncertainty, a court might well conclude
that even minority shareholders who have ratified a . . .[parent-subsidiary] merger need procedural protections beyond those afforded by full
disclosure of all material facts. One way to provide such protections
would be to adhere to the more stringent entire fairness standard ofjudicial review.
Id. at 1116-17 (quoting Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490,
502 (Del. Ch. 1990)); See Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1194, 1205 (Del. Ch. 1995)
(noting that de facto or de jure status of controlling stockholder was critical in
prior decisions and stating that "the potential for process manipulation by the controlling stockholder, and the concern that the controlling stockholder's continued
presence might influence even a fully informed shareholder vote, justify the need
for the exacting judicial scrutiny and procedural protection afforded by the entire
fairness form of review"). The court in Kahn relied on Rosenblatt and Citron for its
decision. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Company, 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (reexamining standard of review and allocation of burden of proof established in
Weinberger); Citron, 584 A.2d at 502 (evaluating merger of Remington Arms Company with Dupont).
Rosenblatt involved a cash-out merger that was ultimately ratified by a majority
of the corporation's disinterested shareholders. See Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 931-34.
The court found that Getty Oil Company, the majority stockholder of the target
company, bore the burden of establishing the merger's entire fairness. See id. at
937 (reaffirming its view that although burden of proving merger's unfairness
shifted entirely to plaintiffs, controlling stockholder defendant maintained burden
of showing complete disclosure of facts that would have been relevant to vote of
minority stockholders) (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703). In analyzing the fairness of the merger,. the court stated that an "independent bargaining structure,
while not conclusive, is strong evidence of the fairness" of a merger transaction.
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dependent committee must have the power to negotiate freely,
which includes the power to reject the offer of the de jure or de
facto controlling shareholders.
Thus, in situations involving transactions between a self-interested controlling shareholder and a corporation, disinterested
shareholder ratification or approval by independent directors shifts
the burden of proof to the plaintiff to prove that the transaction is
unfair. 2 13 As noted above, these cases frequently involve, but are
See id. at 938 n.7 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709-11, 709 n.7). Therefore, the
existence of an independent committee does not affect the standard of review, but
rather, affects the ability of the plaintiff to prove the unfairness of the transaction.
See id. (noting that use of "independent bargaining structure," although not conclusive, is evidence of fairness).
In Citron, in light of the merger's ratification by a vote of a fully informed
majority of Remington's minority stockholders, the court imposed the entire fairness standard of review and shifted the burden onto the plaintiff to establish the
merger's unfairness. Citron, 584 A.2d at 502 (ruling that shareholder ratification
in context of parent-subsidiary merger "operates only to shift the burden of persuasion, not to change the substantive standard of review (entire fairness)"). According to the court, an inference could be drawn from the language in Weinberger
that the substantive review standard for such a transaction would be the business
judgment rule. See id. (citing Weinberger,457 A.2d at 703). Further, regarding the
subsidiary's directors, the court concluded that "adversarial, arm's length negotiations by a special committee of directors 'may give rise to the proposition that the
directors' actions are more appropriately measured by business judgment standards.'" Id. at 501 n.16 (quoting Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937-38). The court continued: "However, nowhere does the Rosenblatt opinion suggest that in these
circumstances the claims against the parent corporation would likewise be evaluated under the business judgment standard." Id. at 501 (noting more stringent
entire fairness standard is applied in parent-subsidiary mergers that involve controlling stockholder). The court stated:
Parent-subsidiary mergers ... are proposed by a party that controls, and
will continue to control, the corporation, whether or not the minority
stockholders vote to approve or reject the transaction. The controlling
stockholder relationship has the inherent potential to influence, however
subtly, the vote of minority stockholders in a manner that is not likely to
occur in a transaction with a noncontrolling party.
Id. at 502 (justifying use of entire fairness standard on belief that "no court could
be certain whether the transaction terms fully approximate what truly independent
parties would have achieved in an arm's length negotiation," and thus, entire fairness standard serves as "procedural protection").
213. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (summarizing effect of shareholder ratification in situations involving controlling shareholder). The court explained:
The initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party who
stands on both sides of the transaction. However, an approval of the
transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed
majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue
of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff. Nevertheless, even when an interested
cash-out merger transaction receives the informed approval of a maiority
of minority stockholders or an independent committee of disintelested
directors, an entire fairness analysis is the only proper standard ofjudicial
review.
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not limited to, parent-subsidiary mergers that have been approved
2 14
by a majority of the minority shareholders.
Two reasons underlie the policy of maintaining the more stringent entire fairness standard of review in parent-subsidiary mergers
even though disinterested directors or shareholders ratified the
transaction. First, the entire fairness standard limits the potential
coercive power that the controlling shareholder may exert over the
minority. 21 5 When a transaction involves a controlling shareholder,
there is a strong possibility that the transaction will not be the result
of an arm's length bargain, even when disinterested shareholder
approval exists. 2 16 The disinterested stockholders may recognize
Id. (citations omitted); see Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d at 1205 ("In both Kahn and
Stroud, the Supreme Court determined that the effect of a fully informed shareholder vote was to shift the burden of proof within the entire fairness standard of
review.") (citations omitted).
214. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (ruling that entire fairness standard applied
to parent-subsidiary mergers, with shareholder ratification acting to shift burden
of proof to plaintiff to establish unfairness) (citing Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937);
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709-10 n.7 ("Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a
showing that the action taken was as though each of the contending parties had in
fact exerted its bargaining power against the other at arm's length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness." (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly
Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1970))); see also Citron, 584 A.2d at 502 ("Even
where no coercion is intended, shareholders voting on a parent-subsidiary merger
might perceive that their disapproval could risk retaliation of some kind by the
controlling stockholder.").
215. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116 (defining policy rationale for applying entire
fairness even when ratification exists). According to the court, the entire fairness
standard is the appropriate standard of review in interested merger transactions
because the controlling stockholder may unduly influence minority stockholders
or retaliate against opposing stockholders by withholding dividends or effecting a
subsequent'cash-out merger at a "less favorable price." See id. at 1116-17. Accordingly, Kahn seems to stand for the proposition that the entire fairness standard
applies exclusively to such transactions. The Kahn court stated that
this Court holds that the exclusive standard ofjudicial review in examining the propriety of an interested cash-out merger transaction by a controlling or dominating shareholder is entire fairness.... [E]ven when an
interested cash-out merger transaction receives the informed approval of
a majority of minority stockholders or an independent committee of disinterested directors, an entire fairness analysis is the only proper standard
of judicial review.
Id. at 1117 (citations omitted).
216. See id. at 1116 ("The controlling stockholder relationship has the potential to influence, however subtly, the vote of [ratifying] minority stockholders in a
manner that is not likely to occur in a transaction with a noncontrolling party.").
Furthermore, the court stated:
"[A] shareholder who owns less than 50% of a corporation's outstanding
stocks does not, without more, become a controlling shareholder of that
corporation, with a concomitant fiduciary status. For a dominating relationship to exist in the absence of controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff
must allege domination by a minority shareholder through actual control
of corporation conduct."
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that a no vote on a transaction desired by a controlling shareholder
could lead to adverse consequences for the minority because the
2 17
controlling shareholder will remain such after the vote occurs.
Second, courts have refused to apply the business judgment rule to
parent-subsidiary cash-out mergers because, under Delaware law,
they do not require a business purpose. 21 8 The rules described
above concerning the effect of ratification seem also to be applicable in self-interested, nonmerger transactions between a controlling
shareholder and the corporation.
21 9
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Stroud v. Grace
discusses the applicable standard of review in a self-interested, nonmerger transaction between a controlling shareholder and the corporation. 220 The court in Stroud stated that "[u] nder Delaware law
Id. at 1114 (alterations in original) (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989)).
217. See WheelabratorII, 663 A.2d at 1205 (justifying application of entire fairness standard even where shareholders ratify controlling shareholder transactions
because of overriding concerning that "the controlling stockholder's continued
presence might influence even a fully informed shareholder vote").
218. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116 ("[I]t would be inconsistent with ... Weinberger to apply the business judgment rule in the context of an interested merger
transaction which, by its very nature, did not require a business purpose." (citing
Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937)).
219. 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
220. Id. at 80 (noting that board's amendments established, among other
things, new method of qualifying directors for membership). Stroud involved directors of a privately held corporation who wished to amend their bylaws regarding
board qualifications and disqualification of future board nominees. Id. The board
unanimously adopted amendments, sent out notice and held a board meeting to
approve the amendments. See id. Several shareholders sued, alleging that the
board provided misstatements of material fact within the notice for the shareholder meeting. See id. The plaintiffs argued for application of Unocals enhanced
scrutiny; however, the court rejected such an application because of the shareholder vote and the fact that the corporation faced no threat to its policy, effectiveness or control. See id. at 82-83 (holding that because directors already controlled
over 50% of corporation's stock before they approved amendments, there was no
threat to corporate control).
In Stroud, the Supreme Court of Delaware considered a challenge to the fairness of charter and bylaw amendments proposed by the corporation's controlling
stockholders in their capacity as members of the board of directors. Id. at 79-80.
In Stroud, as in Kahn, Rosenblatt and Weinberger, a fully informed majority of the
minority shareholders voted to approve the transaction, which in Stroud involved
charter amendments. Id. The court in Stroud ruled that the effect of involvement
by controlling stockholders was to invoke the entire fairness standard, and that the
stockholder ratification "[shifted] the burden of proof to the [plaintiffs] to prove
that the transaction was unfair." Id. at 90 (citing Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
535 A.2d 840, 846 (Del. 1987); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del.
1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); Michelson v.
Duncan, 407 A. 2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979); Gotlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d
57, 58-59 (Del. 1952)). Specifically, the court stated that the plaintiff held the
burden of establishing that the charter amendments were unfair to the corporation. See id. (holding that, because controlling stockholder directors had not
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a fully informed shareholder vote in favor of a disputed transaction
ratifies board action in the absence of fraud."22 1 Of course, the
burden of proving that the shareholders were fully informed of all
the material facts relevant to their approval of the transaction is on
the interested shareholder relying on the vote. 222 The court held

that because a majority of disinterested and informed shareholders
ratified the transaction and the challenging party could not prove
inadequate or misleading disclosures or prove that the board acted
fraudulently, wastefully or with any other misconduct, the burden
then shifted to the challenging party to prove that the transaction
was unfair. 223 Although the court in Stroud did not clearly articulate
why the entire fairness standard was applicable in the first instance,
the only reasonable explanation is that it found the transaction to

breached their fiduciary duties in connection with stockholder ratification vote,
burden rested on challenging party to prove entire fairness).
221. Id. at 82 (citing Bershad, 535 A.2d at 846; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890;
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703; Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224; Gottlieb, 91 A.2d at 58-59;
Gerlach v. Gillam, 139 A.2d 591, 593 (Del. Ch. 1958)). In Van Gorkom, Michelson
and Gottlieb, the courts applied the business judgment rule as the appropriate standard of review. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 870-71 (applying business judgment
rule); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703-04 (same); Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224-25 (same).
Van Gorkom involved a cash-out merger with a noncontrolling third party, and
therefore, the decision of the board of directors to approve the merger, followed
by stockholder ratification, was subject to business judgment rule review. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864-70. The holdings in Van Gorkom and Wheelabrator H are
consistent-the business judgment rule is the applicable standard of review in
cases involving mergers between a corporation and a noncontrolling stockholder.
See Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d 1193, 1204-05 (Del. Ch. 1995) (stating that ratified
transaction not involving controlling stockholder is reviewed under business judgment rule with burden on plaintiff to prove gift or waste).
Michelson and Gottlieb involved nonmerger transactions, leading the courts to
apply the business judgment rule. The court's choice of the business judgment
rule standard in these cases is understandable, especially in light of Kahn, which
applies the entire fairness standard solely because that case involved a cash-out
merger with a controlling stockholder-a transaction involving no valid business
purpose. See Michelson, 407 A.2d at 224 (applying business judgment rule to case
involving stockholder ratification of stock-option plan); Gottlieb, 91 A.2d at 58-59
(same). Because the decisions made by the boards of directors in Michelson and
Gottlieb involved transactions pertaining to valid business purposes, it is understandable that the courts in those cases would choose to apply the business judgment rule, particularly in light of Kahn. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116-17 (stating that
entire fairness standard must be applied to review cash-out merger involving controlling stockholder because such transaction had no valid business purpose that
would cause business judgment rule to be invoked).
222. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84 (holding that "burden ... remains on those
relying on the vote to show that all material facts relevant to the transaction were
fully disclosed").
223. See id. at 84, 90.
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be a transaction between a self-interested controlling shareholder
224
and the company.
The common fact in the Weinberger line of cases and Stroud was
that each transaction involved a self-interested controlling shareholder. 225 Therefore, the concern about the controlling shareholder influencing-expressly or potentially-the true freedom of
choice of the shareholders is present whether the transaction involves a merger or a nonmerger decision. Consequently, the effect
of fully informed, noncoerced, disinterested shareholder or director ratification in such cases is only to shift the burden of proof to
the challenging party, while retaining fairness as the appropriate
226
standard of review.
These rules are only applicable to transactions between a selfinterested controlling shareholder and the corporation. 227 As noted
above, regardless of ratification, these cases implicate the entire
fairness standard because of the self-interest of the controlling
224. See Bershad 535 A.2d at 841-42, 846 (applying entire fairness standard to
cash-out merger between corporation and controlling stockholder); Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 703 (same). Because Bershad and Weinberger involved controlling stockholders in cash-out mergers, it is difficult to see how they relate to Stroud, in which
there was no merger, but merely an amendment of the corporate charter, an activity that would appear to be an act of directorial business judgment. See Stroud, 606
A.2d at 79-80 (discussing nature of transaction). The holding of Stroud complicates later case law.
In WheelabratorII, for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery cites Stroud
for the proposition that the entire fairness standard is the applicable standard of
review for all transactions involving controlling stockholders, regardless of the nature of the transaction. WheelabratorII, 663 A.2d at 1203 & nn.6-7 (citing Stroud,
606 A.2d at 90). The court in WheelabratorII found that ratification by a "majority
of the minority" shifts the burden regardless of whether the case involves mergers
or other types of transactions. Id. at 1203.
This statement by the Court of Chancery in Wheelabratorappears to conflict
with Kahn and is unsupported by Supreme Court of Delaware precedent. See Kahn,
638 A.2d at 1116 (stating that entire fairness is applicable standard of review regarding parent-subsidiary mergers because no valid business purpose existed, so
business judgment rule cannot be invoked). If Kahn is controlling, however, then
entire fairness should not be the standard of review in a nonmerger transaction
case, regardless of whether the transaction involves a controlling stockholder.
225. Compare Stroud, 606 A.2d at 90 (applying entire fairness standard to challenge of charter and bylaw amendments ratified by controlling shareholders), with
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (applying entire fairness standard to cash-out merger
between corporation and controlling shareholder).
226. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (stating
that ratification of parent-subsidiary merger involving controlling stockholder by
majority of minority stockholders invokes entire fairness standard of review with
burden of proof shifting to plaintiff to show merger's unfairness to corporation).
227. For examples of cases involving controlling shareholders, see generally
Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992) and WheelabratorI, 663 A.2d 1193 (Del. Ch. 1995).
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shareholder. 228 Not all transactions between a controlling shareholder and the corporation will implicate the entire fairness standard. For example, if the controlling shareholder is receiving a
benefit that is shared by the other minority shareholders, the controlling shareholder will not be considered to be engaging in a selfinterested transaction and the business judgment rule will be the
229
appropriate initial standard of review.
B.

InterestedDirector Transactions and Section 144

Conflict of interest concerns are also present in transactions
between a corporation and its directors. Historically, all "interested
director" transactions were voidable per se under common law because of the great potential for conflict of interest. 230 Gradually,
however, courts began to recognize that they should review interested director transactions under the entire fairness standard because interested director transactions could be beneficial to the
228. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (stating entire fairness is only applicable standard when controlling shareholder is part of transaction).
229. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1378 (Del. 1996) (noting that
entire fairness does not apply to situation in which controlling shareholder receives no "non-pro rata or disproportionate benefit"); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d
693, 694-96 (Del. 1971) (holding that, in nonmerger transaction between corporation and controlling shareholder, business judgment rule applied to transaction
that was approved by outside, independent board in absence of proof that controlling shareholder in fact controlled or dominated board); Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil
Co., 267 A.2d 883, 886-87 (Del. 1970) (holding that, in nonmerger transaction
between parent and subsidiary, business judgment rule applied to terms of transaction set by third party). As the Delaware Supreme Court noted in one decision:
A parent does indeed owe a fiduciary duty to its subsidiary when there are
parent-subsidiary dealings. However, this alone will not evoke the intrinsic fairness standard. This standard will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing-the situation when a parent is
on both sides of a transaction with its subsidiary. Self-dealing occurs
when the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the
subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from
the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary.
Sinclair OilCorp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
230. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403-04 (Del. 1987) (comparing
common law rule with other case law decided prior to enactment of title 8, section
144 of Delaware Code). In Marciano,the plaintiffs argued that, absent compliance
with section 144, interested director transactions were voidable per se. See id. at
403. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument and pointed out that in
cases decided before section 144 was enacted, "interested director transactions
were deemed voidable only after an examination of the fairness of a particular
transaction vis-a-vis the nonparticipating shareholders and a determination of
whether the disputed conduct received the approval of a noninterested majority of
directors or shareholders." Id. at 404 (citing Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms
Corp., 64 A.2d 581, 602 (Del. Ch. 1948); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904, 908
(Del. Ch. 1938)).
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corporation, even though an obvious conflict of interest existed in
such transactions.2

31

Later, the courts' review of interested director

transactions was also affected by whether the transaction received
232
the approval of disinterested directors or shareholders.
Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law defines
an "interested director" transaction as a "contract or transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors or officers, or
between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which one or more of its directors or officers are directors or officers, or have a financial
interest. ' 23 3 In each of the described situations, the director stands,

directly or indirectly, on both sides of the transaction and has an
actual or potential conflict of interest with respect to the transaction or contract.2 34 Section 144 does not apply every time a corpo-

231. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) (stating that some
transactions are not inherently detrimental and should not be automatically voidable). "As long as a given transaction is fair to the corporation, and no confidential
relationship betrayed, it may not matter that certain corporate officers will profit as
the result of it." Id.
232. See Marciano,535 A.2d at 404 (finding that some Delaware cases decided
before enactment of section 144 looked at whether disputed conduct received approval of noninterested majority). The Delaware Legislature codified this approach in section 144. See id. (explaining that Delaware legislature adopted courts'
test and that it "is now crystallized in the ratification criteria of section 144(a)").
233. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1974 & Supp. 1990).
234. See Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) ("Classic examples of director
self-interest in a business transaction involve either a director appearing on both
sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal benefit from a transaction
not received by the shareholders generally."); Levien, 280 A.2d at 720 (noting that
self-dealing occurs when parent is on both sides of transaction with its subsidiary).
The Supreme Court of Delaware stated that "[s] elf-dealing occurs when the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in
such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion
of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary." Id.; see also
Puma, 283 A.2d at 695 (stating that Marriott Group cannot be standing "on both
sides of the transaction" within meaning of rule when valuations of property companies and Marriott stock were made by majority of Marriott directors whose independence is unchallenged and whose information was based upon appraisals,
analysis, information and opinions provided by independent experts).
Thus, there are three distinct, specific situations that constitute an interested
director transaction under section 144. First, a contract or transaction between a
director and the corporation would fall within the purview of section 144. A typical situation would be one in which the director sells a piece of his property to the
corporation. Second, a contract or transaction between an organization in which
the director is an officer and a director and the corporation would also be considered an interested director transaction. Third, a contract or transaction between
the corporation and any other party in which the director had a financial interest
would also be considered an interested director transaction governed by section
144.
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ration's directors stand to profit from a particular transaction. 235
For example, section 144 will not apply to a transaction in which all
the shareholders in the corporation share the benefits of the transaction. 236 In addition, insignificant or speculative benefits or financial interests will not make the transaction subject to the section
23 7
144 interested director transaction rules.
The purpose of section 144 is to provide various methods by
which an interested director can remove the taint of the self-interest in an interested director transaction by obtaining the approval
of a "neutral decision maker."238 If the interested director obtains
approval by an impartial body, the courts will shelter the transac235. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (stating situations in which contracts or
transactions involving interested directors are not void or voidable).
236. See Cede III, 663 A.2d 1156, 1170 (Del. 1995) (agreeing with Court of
Chancery's finding that director's hope for better employment is not type of interest dealt with by section 144). The Delaware Supreme Court stated that "[i] n Cede
II, this Court distinguished classic self-dealing from incidental director interest.
To be disqualifying, the nature of the director interest must be substantial." Id. at
1169; see also CedeI, 634 A.2d at 363 ("Provided that the terms of 8 Del. C. § 144 are
met, self-interest, alone, is not a disqualifying factor even for a director. To disqualify a director, for rule rebuttal purposes, there must be evidence of
disloyalty.").
237. See Cede III, 663 A.2d at 1170 (adopting test originally formulated by
Court of Chancery for determining when director's incidental self-interest in transaction is substantial enough to destroy independence of whole board). A director's interest in a transaction is incidental if the director has no present financial
interest in the other corporation, but rather hopes to benefit from the transaction
in other ways, such as a better employment opportunity. See id. at 1169 (noting
that incidental director interest, if it is substantial, can be breach of loyalty). This
.materiality test" is a two-part test that requires a shareholder to show
(1) the materiality of a director's self-interest to the given director's independence; and (2) the materiality of any such self-interest to the collective independence of the board. Proof of materiality under either part
requires a showing that such an interest is reasonably likely to affect the
decision-making process of a reasonable person on a board composed of
such persons.
Cede II, 634 A.2d at 363 (stating that while Delaware Supreme Court did not apply
this materiality test directly to interested director transactions, it was likely that it
would adopt this test when faced with interested director transactions where director had very little financial interest in transaction, but did in fact stand on both
sides of transaction). This test would make Delaware law consistent with the de
minimis principle advocated by the A.L.I.'s Principles of CorporateGovernance, which
provides that "§ 5.02 [the interested director transaction rule] should not be applied to transactions that involve relatively trivial amounts." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §

5.02, at 212 (1994).
238. See Cede II, 634 A.2d. at 365 ("Section 144(a) (1) appears to be a legislative mandate that ... an approving vote of a majority of informed and disinterested directors shall remove any taint of director or directors' self-interest in a
transaction.").
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tion with the protections of the business judgment rule.2 39 Approval by a neutral decision maker does not, however, remove a
transaction from all judicial scrutiny and will not validate an unfair
240
transaction.
Section 144 requires that the challenging shareholder first rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule by showing that
241
the transaction constituted an interested director transaction.
Once the challenging shareholder has met this burden, the transaction will not be automatically voidable if one of the safe harbors
provided by section 144 are met.24 2 The safe harbors include either

approval of the transaction by the disinterested directors on the
board or by the shareholders.
Under section 144(a) (1), approval by fully informed, disinterested and independent directors acting in good faith shelters an
239. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) ("The key to upholding an interested transaction is the approval of some neutral decision-making
body. Under 8 Del. C. § 144, a transaction will be sheltered from shareholder challenge if approved by either a committee of independent directors, the shareholders, or the courts."); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987)
("[A] pproval by fully-informed disinterested director under section 144(a) (1), or
disinterested stockholders under § 144(a) (2), permits invocation of the business
judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of
proof upon the party attacking the transaction.").
240. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (3) (requiring that contract or transaction be "fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or
ratified, by the board of directors, a committee thereof, or the shareholders").
241. See id. § 144(a) (defining "interested director transaction" as "contract
or
transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors or officers, or
between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or
other organization in which one or more of its directors or officers are directors or
officers, or have a financial interest"); Kahn v. Roberts, No. CIV.A.12324, 1995 WL
745056, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 1995) ("The business judgment rule will not apply, however, if the party challenging the corporate conduct establishes a lack of
independence on the part of the directors who approved the transaction." (citing
BLOCK ET AL., supra note 69, at 23-24)).
242. See Oberly, 592 A.2d at 467 ("We see no reason why independent directors
and courts should not also have the power to evaluate fairness, of an interested
transaction."); Marciano,535 A.2d at 404-05 (holding that compliance with section
144 is not only way to prevent interested director transactions from becoming automatically voidable). In Marciano,the corporation was unable to approve or ratify
an interested director transaction because the shareholder directors were deadlocked. Id. at 401. Because section 144(a) requires approval or ratification of an
interested director transaction, the plaintiffs in Marcianoargued that the interested
director transaction should be voidable, regardless of its fairness to the corporation. Id. at 402-04. The court, however, disagreed and found that even if section
144 was not invoked, fair transactions would be upheld if, upon judicial review, the
transaction withstands the close scrutiny of intrinsic elements. See id. at 404-05
(holding that interested director could prevent transaction from becoming voidable by proving that transaction was entirely fair to corporation).
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interested director transaction. 243 The whole board or a committee
may authorize the transaction provided that the authorization is
made by a majority of all the disinterested directors on the
board. 244 The number of disinterested directors need not be sufficient to constitute a quorum as long as a quorum of directors, including interested directors, is present at the time of the vote.2 45 In
order to invoke the protective effects of section 144, the interested
director must disclose all material facts relating to the transaction
and the director's interest to the authorizing directors so that the
disinterested directors will be fully informed when approving the
24 6
transaction.
243. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1) ("No contract or transaction between a corporation and... its directors or officers, or between a corporation and
any other corporation ... in which one or more of its directors [have an interest],
shall be void or voidable.., if... material facts as to his relationship or interest...
are disclosed."); Oberly, 592 A.2d at 466 (finding that enactment of section 144
limited stockholders' power in two ways). The Supreme Court of Delaware stated
that
section 144 allows a committee of disinterested directors to approve a
transaction and bring it within the scope of the business judgment
rule .... When a challenge to fairness is raised, the directors carry the
burden of "establishing ... [the transaction's] entire fairness, sufficient
to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts." . .. If, however, the
directors meet their burden of proving entire fairness, the transaction is
protected from stockholder challenge.
Id. (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)); see also Cede
III, 663 A.2d 1156, 1169 (Del. 1995) (requiring that directors be "independent and
disinterested," meaning director has no financial interest in other corporation or
organization, and is not "beholden" to interested director).
244. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (requiring good faith authorization). The statute states in relevant part:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and one or more of
its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which one or
more of its directors or officers are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of
the board or committee thereof which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the
contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of
the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less
than a quorum.
Id.
245. See id. § 144(b) ("Common or interested directors may be counted in
determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of
a committee which authorizes the contract or transaction.").
246. See id. (requiring ratification by fully informed majority of disinterested
outside directors).
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Under section 144(a) (1), disinterested director approval meets
the requirements of that subsection and eliminates the automatic
voidability of the transaction. 247 In addition,judicial decisions have
held that such approval also affects the standard of review and burden of proof.2 48 Because authorization under section 144(a) (1) re-

quires that the authorizing directors be disinterested, fully
informed and act in good faith, effective section 144(a) (1) approval
necessarily meets the triad of fiduciary duties imposed on the directors.249 Thus, the courts have held that compliance with section

144(a) (1) changes the standard of review from entire fairness to
the business judgment rule with issues limited to gift or waste. 250
Disinterested director authorization also shifts the burden of proof
2 51
from the interested director to the challenging party.

Similarly, section 144(a) (2) provides that approval of the transaction by a majority of the minority shareholders also creates a safe
harbor for interested director transactions. 252 Section 144(a) (2) re247. See id.
248. See Cede II, 634 A.2d 345, 365 (Del. 1993) (noting that section 144(a)
removes "interested director cloud" from transaction and permits otherwise interested transactions to be brought within protection of business judgment rule).
The Supreme Court of Delaware explained the significance of section 144:
Enacted in 1967, section 144(a) codified judicially acknowledged principles of corporate governance to provide a limited safe harbor for corporate boards to prevent director conflicts of interest from voiding
corporate action ....At the very least section 144(a) protects corporate
actions from invalidation on grounds of director self-interest if such selfinterest is: (1) disclosed to and approved by a majority of disinterested
directors; (2) disclosed to and approved by the shareholders; or (3) the
contract or transaction is found to be fair "as to the corporation."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d
490, 500 (Del. Ch. 1990) (stating that under section 144, if shareholder challenges
interested director transaction, it will not be void "solely for that reason" if transaction is (1) approved in good faith by informed majority of disinterested directors
on board (or committee comprised of majority of board's disinterested directors);
(2) ratified in good faith by informed shareholder vote; or (3) entirely fair to corporation at time it was approved or ratified).
249. See Cede II, 634 A.2d at 360 (defining business judgment rule as "'presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and in the 'honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interest of the company"' (quoting Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (alteration in original)).
250. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (comparing
subsection 144(a) (3) with subsections 144(a)(1) and (2) and noting that, in latter
subsections, burden of proof falls upon party attacking transaction).
251. See Cooke v. Oolle, No. CIV.A.11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch.
June 23, 1997).
252. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (explaining effect
of subsection 144(a) (2)). Although the statute does not require that the ratification be made by disinterested and independent shareholders, the Delaware courts
will only shelter an interested director transaction under the business judgment
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quires that the shareholders act in good faith and that the interested director disclose all the material facts relating to the
253
Secdirector's interest and the transaction to the shareholders.

tion 144(a) (2) does not require that the approval be made by disinterested shareholders. If the shareholders approving the interested
director transaction are not disinterested and independent, but the
transaction is otherwise approved in compliance with section
144(a) (2), the effect of the approval is only that the interested director transaction will not be 'automatically voidable. 25 4 Because
the approval was not made by a neutral decision maker, the burden
of proof will remain on the interested director to establish the entire fairness of the transaction. 255 When a majority of the disinterested shareholders approves an interested director transaction in
compliance with the other requirements of section 144(a) (2), the
rule if the transaction is approved by a majority of the disinterested shareholders.
See id. at 221 (holding that decision was not protected under business judgment
rule when shareholders were not disinterested and independent).
In Fliegler,shareholders brought a derivative action on behalf of Agau Mines,
Inc. against the directors and officers of Agau and United States Antimony Corporation ("USAC"). See id. at 219. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, in
their capacity as officers and directors of both corporations, had usurped a corporate opportunity belonging to Agau and wrongfully profited by causing Agau to
exercise an option to purchase that opportunity. See id. The defendants had
formed USAC to develop a mineral prospect without risk to Agau. See id. at 220.
The mineral prospect turned out to be promising, so the defendants caused Agau
to exercise its option to purchase the mineral prospect from USAC. See id. The
decision was put to the shareholders, including the defendants, for approval. See
id.
When minority shareholders challenged the decision, the defendants claimed
that the business judgment rule protected their decision. See id. The court
disagreed:
The purported ratification by the Agau shareholders would not affect the
burden of proof in this case because the majority of shares voted in favor
of exercising the option were cast by defendants in their capacity as Agau
shareholders. Only about one-third of the "disinterested" shareholders
voted, and we cannot assume that such non-voting shareholders either
approved or disapproved. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that
"the entire atmosphere has been freshened" and that departure from the
objective fairness test is permissible .... Nor do we believe that the Legislature intended a contrary policy and rule to prevail by enacting 8 Del. C.
§ 144 ....
Id. at 221 (citations omitted) (recognizing that interested director who is also large
shareholder could ratify transaction that was not in best interests of corporation).
253. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2) (setting forth factors required to
validate transactions).
254. See Fliegler,361 A.2d at 222 ("Section 144 merely removes an 'interested
director' cloud when its terms are met and provides against invalidation of an
agreement 'solely' because such a director or officer is involved.").
255. See id. at 221 (refusing to allow ratification by majority of shareholders to
affect burden of proof when majority of shares voted in favor of option were cast
by defendants, who were interested parties).
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approval not only eliminates the automatic voidability of the transaction, but also changes the standard of review to the business judgment rule with the burden on the challenging party to show gift or
25 6
waste.
Even if the interested director cannot prove that disinterested
directors approved the transaction under section 144(a) (1) or disinterested shareholders approved the transaction under section
144(a) (2), the interested director may still shelter the transaction
from the rule of per se voidability and validate the transaction by
proving that the transaction is entirely fair to the corporation under
2 57
section 144(a) (3) or otherwise.
C.

Transactions Not Involving Controlling Shareholders or Interested
Director Transactions in Which Loyalty Claims Arise

As noted above, when a majority of the disinterested directors
on a board approves or a majority of the minority stockholders ratifies a transaction involving a corporation and its self-interested controlling shareholder, courts apply the entire fairness standard but
shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff to establish the unfairness
of the challenged transaction. 258 In contrast, the effect of disinterested director or shareholder approval in an interested director
transaction is to shift the burden to the challenging party to prove
256. For a discussion of shifting burdens of proof, see supra notes 35-43 and
accompanying text. Because approval was made by shareholders who were disinterested, fully informed and acted in good faith, approval by disinterested shareholders under subsection 144(a) (2) again changes the standard of review to the
business judgment rule with the issues limited to gift or waste (i.e., whether the
decision was rational).
257. See Fliegler,361 A.2d at 221 (requiring interested director to show entire
fairness of transaction); see also Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991)
(stating that approval by committee of independent directors or shareholders is
sufficient to shelter transaction from shareholder challenge); Marciano v. Nakash,
535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) ("[A]pproval by fully-informed disinterested
directors under section 144(a) (1), or disinterested stockholders under section
144(a) (2), permits invocation of the business judgment rule and limits judicial
review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the party attacking
the transaction."); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (stating
that in interested director transactions, directors "are required to demonstrate
their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain
....
The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one
stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire
fairness").
258. See Cooke v. Oolle, No. CIV.A.11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch.
June 23, 1997) (noting that only way burden shifts to challenger to prove unfairness of transaction is if corporation demonstrates approval by "truly independent,"
and fully informed body).
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that the transaction amounted to gift or waste.2 59 The next issue
that arises is which paradigm, if either, will govern a transaction
that: (1) involves ratification by disinterested directors or shareholders; and (2) triggers the entire fairness standard because a majority of the board is interested or not independent; but (3) is
neither an interested director transaction nor a self-interested controlling shareholder transaction.
In In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
("Wheelabrator If,),260 the court held that the business judgment
rule was applicable to the situation in which informed disinterested
shareholders ratified a transaction involving a breach of the duty of
loyalty because a majority of the board was interested or not independent but which did not involve a controlling shareholder or
interested director. 26 1 In such a situation, the court held that the

applicable review standard changes to the business judgment rule
262
and the burden of proof shifts to the challenging party.

259. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2) (stating that approval limits issues
to gift and waste); see also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992) ("In sum,
after finding that the shareholder vote was fully informed, and in the absence of
any fraud, manipulative or other inequitable conduct, that should have ended the
matter on basic principles of ratification.").
260. 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995).
261. Id. at 1196-97. In WheelabratorII,the board recommended a merger with
Waste Management, Inc. ("WMI") to its shareholders. Id. at 1198. A majority of
disinterested shareholders approved the merger. See id. The shareholder plaintiffs
brought a suit against Wheelabrator alleging that the directors violated their duty
to disclose all material facts to the shareholders, breached their duty of care and
breached their duty of loyalty in that several directors had conflicts of interest with
WMI that prevented them from seeking the best price for the shareholders. See id.
at 1196-97. The board claimed that the plaintiffs had extinguished their claims by
approving the merger through a shareholder vote. See id. at 1196.
262. See id. at 1203 (holding that in interested transactions between corporation and its directors, between two corporations 'that share certain directors or
when directors of one corporation have interest in other corporation, approval by
majority of fully informed shareholders invoked business judgment rule). The
court stated, "[a] pproval by fully informed, disinterested shareholders pursuant to
§ 144(a) (2) invokes 'the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues
of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the party attacking the transaction."' Id. at 1203 (quoting Marciano, 535 A.2d at 405 n.3). The court in WheelabratorII, recognizing that the result was the same in "interested" transaction cases
not decided under section 144, stated that "[w]here there has been independent
shareholder ratification of interested director actions, the objecting stockholder
has the burden of showing that no person of ordinary sound business judgment
would say that the consideration received for the options was a fair exchange for
the options granted." Id. (quoting Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del.
1979)).
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Claim Extinguishment

Over thirty years ago, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
"the entire atmosphere is freshened and a new set of rules invoked
where formal approval has been given by a majority of independent, fully informed stockholders."' 263 The Delaware courts have recently tried to explain the situations in which valid shareholder
ratification will provide a complete defense to a breach of fiduciary
duty claim. 264 There are two situations in which a fully informed

shareholder vote extinguishes a shareholder claim.
First, shareholder approval can extinguish a shareholder challenge when a board acts in good faith, but exceeds its actual authority. 2 65 Second, valid shareholder approval may extinguish a
shareholder claim when the board does not adequately inform itself before approving a transaction, but receives fully informed, dis2 66
interested shareholder approval.
The first situation is a restatement of the traditional agency
rule that ratification by the principal (in this case, the shareholders), cures unauthorized acts of the agent (the board), unless the
ratification procedure was unfair or procedurally defective. 267 It is
important here to distinguish between voidable and void acts.
Voidable acts are those that the board performed in the interest of
the corporation in which the board exceeded its actual authority.
Void acts are those acts that are ultra vires, fraudulent or constitute
263. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 59 (Del. 1952) (finding
that within corporate realm "the majority may enforce its will upon a dissenting
minority").
264. See WheelabratorII, 663 A.2d at 1202 (noting that view that shareholder
ratification constitutes full defense to breach of fiduciary duty claims is overbroad
in light of complex nature of law).
265. See Michelson, 407 A.2d at 219-24.
266. See Wheelabrator11, 663 A.2d at 1202 (explaining instances in which Delaware Supreme Court has found shareholder ratification of voidable director conduct to result in claim extinguishment).
267. See Michelson, 407 A.2d at 219-20 ("[A] validly accomplished shareholder
ratification relates back to cure otherwise unauthorized acts of officers and direcIf shareholders have approved an otherwise voidable act, their approval
tors ....
extinguishes any claim for losses based on prior lack of authority of the directors to
undertake such action."). In Michelson, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a
less than unanimous shareholder vote was procedurally adequate to ratify board
action. Id. at 220 (holding ratification permissible even where action made beyond the scope of its authority "unless the ratification procedure proved to be
lacking in fairness or procedurally defective"). The plaintiff shareholder in Michelson brought a derivative suit, claiming that the board exceeded its authority by
granting stock options to officers and directors of the corporation. Id. at 215. In
response to this claim, the board obtained ratification of the transaction from less
than a unanimous shareholder vote. See id. at 219.
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gift or waste. 268 Shareholder ratification can cure voidable acts. 269
Even some void acts can be cured, but only by unanimous share270
holder approval.
The second situation in which a shareholder vote can extinguish a claim against the board is when the board has breached its
duty of care because the directors failed to adequately inform themselves before undertaking the challenged transaction.2 71 For example, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 272 the Delaware Supreme Court

concluded that a fully informed shareholder vote could cure a
2 73
board's uninformed decision to merge.
Shareholder ratification, however, does not extinguish duty of
loyalty claims. 2 74 Instead, regardless of what type of duty of loyalty
268. See id. at 218-19 (explaining difference between voidable and void acts).
The Delaware Supreme Court stated:
The essential distinction between voidable and void acts is that the former are those which may be found to have been performed in the interest of the corporation but beyond the authority of management, as
distinguished from acts which are ultra vires, fraudulent or gifts or waste
of corporate assets.
Id.
269. See WheelabratorII, 663 A.2d at 1202. The court stated:
The Delaware Supreme Court has found shareholder ratification of "voidable" director conduct to result in claim-extinguishment in only two circumstances. The first is where the directors act in good faith, but exceed
the board's de jure authority ....

The second circumstance is where the

directors fail "to reach an informed business judgment" in approving a
transaction.
Id. (citations omitted); see Michelson, 407 A.2d at 220 (explaining that question of
whether shareholders were fully informed, making their ratification of director
action valid, "turns on the fairness and completeness of the proxy materials submitted by the management to the ... shareholders"); see also, Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 59 (Del. 1952) ("[T]he entire atmosphere is freshened
and a new set of rules invoked where a formal approval has been given by a majority of independent, fully informed stockholders.").
270. See Michelson, 407 A.2d at 219 (explaining that "practical distinction" between voidable and void acts is that voidable acts are susceptible to cure by shareholder ratification while void acts are not); see also Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d
327, 335 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that for shareholders to ratify waste, vote must be
unanimous).
271. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) (concluding
that board was grossly negligent for failing to act in informed manner when agreeing to merger).
272. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
273. Id. at 889-90 ("The fact that the Board had no reasonably adequate information indicative of the intrinsic value of the Company, other than a concededly
depressed market price, was without question material to the shareholders voting
on the merger.").
274. See WheelabratorII,663 A.2d 1194, 1201 (Del. Ch. 1995) (explaining that
Weiss and WheelabratorI are no longer applicable). The court stated that
since 1990, the law has changed, and there is now significant reason to
conclude that WheelabratorI and Weiss would not be regarded as good law
today. Not only has the Delaware Supreme Court never endorsed the
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claim is made, shareholder ratification only alters either the standard of review and/or shifts the burden of proof in duty of loyalty
claims. 2 75 For example, as previously discussed in Wheelabrator II,
the court held that even though the challenged party raised a duty
of loyalty claim that implicated the entire fairness standard, a fully
informed shareholder vote can change the standard of review and
shift the burden of proof, but does not automatically extinguish the
plaintiff's duty of loyalty claim. 276 As noted above, loyalty claims are
not extinguished in situations involving ratification of self-inter27 7
ested controlling shareholder or interested director transactions.
In such situations, the duty of loyalty claim is not extinguished, but
the ratification does shift the burden of proof in both situations
and changes the standard of review for interested director
278
transactions.
The Delaware Supreme Court recently held that a shareholder
vote approving a merger could not ratify unilateral board decisions
view adopted in those cases, the decisions that postdate Weiss and Wheelabrator I persuasively indicate that the Supreme Court would not hold
that shareholder approval of a board action claimed to violate the fiduciary duty of loyalty would operate automatically to extinguish a duty of
loyalty claim.
Id.
275. See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del.
1994) (holding that effect of shareholder ratification on cash-out merger between
corporation and controlling stockholder is to change standard of review to entire
fairness and shift burden of proof to challenging shareholder); see also Wheelabrator
II, 663 A.2d at 1204 (explaining that Kahn holding indicates that duty of loyalty
claims are not extinguishable). The WheelabratorII court stated:
Had Weiss or Wheelabrator I been viewed as the correct ratification rule,
the Supreme Court [in Kahn] could have stated that the effect of shareholder ratification would be to extinguish the duty of loyalty claim. Instead, however, the Supreme Court held that in an interested merger
with a controlling stockholder, the applicable judicial review standard is
entire fairness, and shareholder ratification merely shifts the burden of
proof on the fairness issue from the controlling stockholder to the challenging plaintiff.
Id. (citing Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117). Furthermore, the court found the Stroud holding to indicate that duty of loyalty claims are not extinguishable. Id.; see also Stroud
v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 90 (Del. 1992) (holding that ratification of charter amendments by fully informed vote of majority of minority shareholders resulted in application of entire fairness standard of review and shifted burden of proof to
plaintiffs).
276. See Wheelabrator II, 663 A.2d at 1200 (noting that fully informed shareholder vote operated to extinguish duty of care claims, but not duty of loyalty
claims).
277. See id. at 1202 ("More specifically, no Supreme Court case has held that
shareholder ratification operates automatically to extinguish a duty of loyalty
claim.").
278. See id. (noting that effect of ratification in duty of loyalty claims is for
burden to shift or for standard of review to change, or both).
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that Were made leading up to the ultimate merger agreement. 279
The court chose not to categorize Revlon and Unocal duties as arising from either the duty of care or the duty of loyalty, thereby
avoiding the issues as to which ratification approach, if any, applied
in those situations. 28° Because the shareholders did not specifically
approve the underlying decisions of the board leading up to the
merger and because of the significance of a contest for control, the
court noted that even if a majority of stockholders approved the
merger, it would still review the decisions leading up to the merger
under enhanced judicial scrutiny because to do otherwise would
281
frustrate the purposes underlying enhanced judicial scrutiny.
279. See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del.
1995) ("Since the stockholders of Santa Fe merely voted in favor of the merger and
not the defensive measures, we decline to find ratification in this instance."). In
Santa Fe, the shareholder plaintiffs claimed that the board had breached its duty
under Revlon to seek maximum shareholder value by not considering alternatives
to the Burlington Northern, Inc. ("BNI") merger offer and that the board had
violated its Unocalduty by implementing a poison-pill plan in response to a merger
offer from Union Pacific. Id. at 65. Santa Fe favored a merger with BNI. See id. As
a result, the board adopted a poison-pill plan to prevent a merger with Union
Pacific. See id. The plan provided that if any bidder other than BNI accumulated
more than 10% of Santa Fe's stock, the shareholders would have the option to sell
their shares for twice their value. See id. The board eventually agreed to merge
with BNI, and the shareholders approved the transaction. See id. The plaintiff
shareholders brought suit against the board claiming that (1) the board breached
its Revlon duty by not seeking the best value available; (2) the board breached its
Unocal duty by adopting the poison-pill plan; and (3) the board did not fully disclose all material facts of the deal. See id. The board argued that, by voting to
approve the merger, the plaintiffs had extinguished their claims. See id.
280. See id. at 67 (explaining refusal to categorize Revlon and Unocal duties).
The Delaware Supreme Court stated:
While the Court of Chancery concluded that claimed breaches of the
duty of loyalty are not extinguished by a fully-informed stockholder vote
and that Revlon and Unocalclaims are duty of loyalty claims for ratification
purposes, we reach the same result on different grounds. Revlon and Unocal and the duties of a Board when faced with a contest for corporate
control do not admit of easy categorization as duties of care or loyalty. In
any event, categorizing these more specific duties as primarily arising
from due care or loyalty would not be nearly as helpful in determining
the effect of a fully-informed stockholder vote as would an examination
of their underlying purposes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
281. See id. at 68 (explaining underlying purposes of enhanced judicial scrutiny). The court stated that the "Unocal standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny
rests in part on an 'assiduous . . . concern about defensive actions designed to
thwart the essence of corporate democracy by disenfranchising shareholders.'" Id.
at 67 (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del.
1995)). In addition, the court noted that "Revlon also rests on the 'overriding importance of voting rights.'" Id. at 68 (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993)). The court in Santa Fe explained
its reluctance to find ratification of the defensive measures:
In voting to approve the Santa Fe-Burlington merger, the Santa Fe stockholders were not asked to ratify the Board's unilateral decision to erect
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On the other hand, because one of the requisites for triggering review under Unocal or Blasius is unilateral board action, noncoerced
shareholder ratification of the specific defensive measure or action
effecting the shareholder franchise will eliminate any Unocal or Bla28 2
sius claims.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Part II of this Article has described the basic principles that
apply in situations in which conflicts of interest arise in transactions
that involve decisions outside the ordinary course of business. This
area of the law is even more fact sensitive than the rules governing
the day-to-day decisions discussed in Part I. The nuances involved
in these cases are very important and often subtle, but are crucial in
determining how the courts will review the challenged transaction.
There are numerous law review articles and treatises that discuss the nuances in the areas covered by Part II. As we noted in the
Introductions to Parts I and II, our goal is to provide a primer on
the basic rules of the game. In Part II, we have tried to give our
readers a simple road map to enable them to understand how
courts review transactions that involve board conflicts of interest in

three situations. First, when the board adopts defensive measures. 28 3 Second, when the corporation is up for sale or there is a
defensive measures against the Union Pacific offer. The stockholders
were merely offered a choice between the Burlington Merger and doing
nothing. The Santa Fe stockholders did not vote in favor of the precise
measures under challenge in the complaint. Here, the defensive measures had allegedly already worked their effect before the stockholders
had a chance to vote. In voting on the merger, the Santa Fe stockholders
did not specifically vote in favor of the Rights Plan, the Joint Tender or
the Termination Fee. Since the stockholders of Santa Fe merely voted in
favor of the merger and not the defensive measures, we decline to find
ratification in this instance.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, the court in Santa Fe added that
Board action which coerces stockholders to accede to a transaction to
which they otherwise would not agree is problematic. "We have found
that even in light of a valid threat, management actions that are coercive
in nature or force upon shareholders a management sponsored alternative to a hostile offer may be struck down as unreasonable and non-proportionate responses." Thus, enhanced judicial scrutiny of Board action
is designed to assure that stockholders vote or decide to tender in an
atmosphere free from undue coercion.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990)).
282. For a discussion of Unocaland Blasius, see supra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
283. For an in-depth discussion of the standard that Delaware courts employ
when a board adopts defensive measures, see supra notes 44-94 and accompanying
text.
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change of control transaction. 28 4 And third, when the board
285
manipulates shareholder voting rights.

We must caution those relatively unfamiliar with Delaware law
that while understanding the rules of the game is essential to effective representation of the players, the simplicity of both Parts of this
Article and the decision tree in Appendix A do not fully reflect the
sophistication and complexity of most cases in the Delaware courts.
As we noted before, the Delaware courts have been particularly adept at maintaining a high degree of flexibility in shaping the Delaware law to fit diverse and complex situations, while at the same
time consistently applying the basic rules of the game.
We must also warn the reader that real life is not quite as structured as the reader might surmise from reading Parts I and II. Frequently, there is no clear indication of who has the burden of proof
and what the ultimate standard of review is until the Delaware
Chancery Court considers the evidence from both sides. At that
point, the court decides (1) what the appropriate initial standard of
review is; (2) which party has the initial burden of proof; (3)
whether the standard of review changed; (4) whether the burden of
proof shifted one or more times; (5) whether any effective ratification occurred; and (6) what, if any, legal effect the ratification had
on the transaction. The underlying legal tenets outlined above
form the backdrop for the final decisions on these issues made by
the Chancery Court.
In virtually every case, both parties try to present their best factual and legal case and then argue that (1) the opposing side has
the burden; (2) the opposing side's burden is the most stringent
one possible; (3) the opposing side failed to meet that burden; (4)
even if our side has the burden, the least stringent form of review
applies; and (5) our side satisfied its burden under even the most
stringent standard of review.
This Article necessarily compartmentalizes the various principles to make them easier to understand. Thus, a reader unfamiliar
with Delaware practice could infer that the shifting burdens and
standards of review are always easily discernable. In practice, there
are very few bright lines. No bells ring or lights shine when the
presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted or the board
proves entire fairness. Rather, each party presents its best case on
284. For an in-depth discussion of the enhanced Revlon standard, see supra
notes 95-149 and accompanying text.
285. For an in-depth discussion of the Blasius "compelling justification" standard, see supra notes 150-87 and accompanying text.
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the assumption that the court will impose the burden of proof and
the least desirable standard of review upon that party. Typically,
the winner of the game is not known until the Chancery Court, and
often the Delaware Supreme Court, ultimately determines the appropriate standard of review and burden of proof and resolves the
legal and factual issues involved. The parties, however, will use the
basic rules of the game to persuade the courts to apply the most
favorable standard of review and shift the burden of proof to their
adversary.
The nuances that this Article did not discuss are varied and are
frequently outcome determinative. Like all games, however, the
nuances cannot be appreciated or used effectively until the basics
have been mastered. Unlike a game, these cases often involve millions or billions of dollars and can have a tremendous impact on
people's lives. Sensitive to these ramifications, the courts use these
rules as they should be used, as tools designed to achieve just, fair
and rational results. The authors urge each reader to do the same.
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A

BOARD OF DIRECTOR DuTY/LIABLITy DECISION TREE
UNDER DELAWARE CoRPoRATE LAW

GO TO
BUSINESS
JUDGMENT
RULE ANALYSIS

Key -

Burden On
Board

I

Burden On
Challenging Party

Term nation
Point

Go To
Information

Abbreviations: CP, challenging party; SH, shareholder.

L-----------------------------------------------
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BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE ANALYSIS
Did Board Breach One Or More Duties:
1. Duty of Loyalty
2. Duty of Care
3. Duty of Good Faith
4. Duty of Disclosure
Van Gorkamn/Cede

C es)
Was Decision Irrational?
If NO, Then Board Wins
If YES, Then CP Wins On Liability
Unless Unanimous SH Ratification)
- For Damages, CP Must Prove
Causation and Damages

RATIFICATION ANALYSIS
Was There Non-Coerced, Fully
Informed, Ratification By
Majority Of Disinterested SHs?

Was There Independent
Committee Approval?
Kahn/Rabkin
1. If YES AND
Duty Of Care Violation Only, Then
- Claim Extinguished, and Board Wins
2. If YES AND
Self Interested
Controlling SH
GO TO ENTIRE FAIRNESS
ANALYSIS With
Burden On CP
3. If YES AND
* Interested Director
Transaction
- GO TO DGCL § 144
ANALYSIS
t............... .... ... ..... ....................................................

ENTIRE FAIRNESS
ANALYSIS
Fair Price
* Fair Dealing
Burden On Challenging Party
To Prove "Unfairness"
Existence Of Independent Committee
Approval Or SH Ratification Is Strong
Evidence Of Fairness
Weinberger
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2nd Prong

Was Board's Action
Reasonable In Relation
To Advantage Sought?

* If Board Proves Both Prongs
- GO TO BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
ANALYSIS Unocal/Mills
OR

* If Board Does Not Prove Both Prongs
- GO TO RATIFICATION ANALYSIS U)
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